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Disclaimer:	  This	  student	  paper	  was	  prepared	  in	  2014	  in	  partial	  completion	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  Master’s	  
Project,	  a	  major	  assignment	  for	  the	  Master	  of	  Public	  Policy	  Program	  at	  the	  Sanford	  School	  of	  Public	  Policy	  at	  
Duke	  University.	  The	  research,	  analysis,	  and	  policy	  alternatives	  and	  recommendations	  contained	  in	  this	  paper	  
are	  the	  work	  of	  the	  student	  who	  authored	  the	  document,	  and	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  official	  or	  unofficial	  views	  of	  
the	  Sanford	  School	  of	  Public	  Policy	  or	  of	  Duke	  University.	  Without	  the	  specific	  permission	  of	  its	  author,	  this	  paper	  
may	  not	  be	  used	  or	  cited	  for	  any	  purpose	  other	  than	  to	  inform	  the	  client	  organization	  about	  the	  subject	  matter.	  
The	  author	  relied	  in	  many	  instances	  on	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  client	  and	  related	  organizations	  and	  makes	  no	  
independent	  representations	  as	  to	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  data.	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Executive	  Summary	  
Introduction	  Net	  food-­‐importing	  countries	  face	  unique	  challenges	  in	  food	  security.	  	  Traditional	  value	  chain	  analysis	  and	  food	  security	  assessments	  do	  not	  consider	  a	  country’s	  international	  trade	  network	  when	  calculating	  the	  food	  security	  levels	  of	  a	  country.	  	  This	  project	  focuses	  on	  wheat	  trade	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (MENA)	  region.1	  	  Wheat	  is	  highly	  consumed	  in	  the	  region,	  which	  is	  overall	  a	  net	  importer	  of	  the	  commodity.	  	  In	  addition,	  wheat	  has	  a	  cultural	  importance	  in	  the	  region—riots	  and	  civil	  unrest	  have	  often	  been	  tied	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  bread	  prices,	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  various	  subsidies	  of	  wheat	  and	  wheat	  products	  demonstrate	  the	  importance	  of	  making	  this	  commodity	  available	  to	  the	  population.	  	  However,	  the	  region	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  a	  net-­‐importer	  of	  this	  commodity.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  traditional	  mechanisms	  of	  food	  security	  assessments,	  which	  generally	  focus	  on	  domestic	  production,	  do	  not	  give	  a	  full	  picture	  of	  a	  country’s	  food	  security	  risks.	  	  Instead,	  assessments	  of	  the	  security	  of	  the	  wheat	  supply	  in	  most	  MENA	  countries	  should	  consider	  international	  trade	  indicators.	  
Methodology	  
	  This	  research	  uses	  social	  network	  analysis	  methodology,	  and	  analyzes	  the	  global	  trade	  network	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  following	  indicators:	  number	  of	  links,	  network	  density,	  
average	  clustering	  coefficient,	  and	  average	  betweenness	  centrality.	  	  Then,	  the	  top	  ranking	  countries	  are	  reported	  in	  two	  node-­‐level	  indicators,	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  which	  detects	  major	  players	  overall,	  and	  authority	  centrality,	  which	  detects	  the	  most	  well	  connected	  importing	  countries.	  	  Finally,	  the	  analysis	  looks	  at	  4	  major	  export	  bans	  that	  affected	  the	  MENA	  region	  between	  2005	  and	  2010,	  and	  notes	  several	  reactionary	  steps	  that	  MENA	  countries	  used	  to	  maintain	  supplies	  of	  wheat	  in	  the	  face	  of	  these	  bans.	  	  Reasons	  for	  failure	  to	  maintain	  supplies	  were	  also	  noted.	  
Policy	  Question	  	   This	  research	  attempts	  to	  add	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  global	  wheat	  trade	  network	  from	  1990-­‐2012,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  MENA	  region.	  	  As	  several	  export	  bans	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	  provide	  exogenous	  shocks	  to	  the	  markets,	  another	  section	  of	  the	  analysis	  addresses	  MENA	  countries’	  reactions	  to	  these	  sudden	  barriers	  to	  trade.	  	  	  As	  a	  preliminary	  look	  at	  the	  wheat	  trade	  network	  over	  time,	  this	  research	  addresses	  the	  question:	  How	  has	  the	  international	  trade	  network	  of	  grain	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  reacted	  to	  
economic	  shocks	  since	  1990?	  	  How	  can	  analyzing	  the	  evolution	  of	  this	  trade	  network	  inform	  
food	  security	  measures	  for	  the	  region?	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Algeria,	  Bahrain,	  Djibouti,	  Egypt,	  Iran,	  Iraq,	  Jordan,	  Kuwait,	  Lebanon,	  Libya,	  Malta,	  Morocco,	  Oman,	  Qatar,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Sudan,	  Syria,	  Tunisia,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza,	  and	  Yemen.	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Results	  Overall,	  the	  network	  is	  becoming	  more	  dense	  but	  less	  divided	  into	  clusters	  as	  countries	  are	  diversifying	  their	  trade	  and	  instigating	  partnerships	  outside	  of	  their	  previous	  clusters.	  	  On	  an	  individual	  country	  level,	  centrality	  measures	  can	  demonstrate	  when	  a	  country	  has	  succeeded	  or	  failed	  in	  forming	  new	  partnerships	  or	  increasing	  trade	  with	  important	  partners,	  often	  to	  overcome	  a	  barrier	  to	  trade	  such	  as	  an	  export	  ban.	  	  Finally,	  countries	  take	  different	  steps	  to	  overcome	  trade	  bans—forming	  new	  partnerships,	  increasing	  trade	  with	  existing	  partners,	  or	  increasing	  production.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  countries	  with	  some	  political	  clout	  or	  purchasing	  power	  from	  their	  size	  are	  able	  to	  accomplish	  this.	  
Conclusion	  	   Social	  network	  analysis	  indicators	  are	  accurately	  descriptive	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  country	  takes	  overcome	  a	  ban.	  	  Depending	  on	  changes	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  network,	  if	  a	  country	  increases	  its	  partnerships	  or	  increases	  quantity	  traded	  from	  important	  partners	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  a	  ban,	  this	  action	  increases	  the	  country’s	  centrality	  scores.	  	  	  While	  this	  analysis	  did	  not	  test	  a	  theory	  of	  correlation	  between	  a	  certain	  indicator	  and	  ability	  to	  maintain	  supplies,	  data	  from	  this	  project	  could	  be	  used	  to	  do	  so.	  	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  further	  research	  explore	  what	  indicators	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  predict	  risk,	  and	  what	  indicators	  (if	  any),	  could	  be	  useful	  to	  predict	  resilience	  in	  the	  face	  of	  that	  risk.	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Overview	  
Net	  food-­‐importing	  countries	  face	  unique	  challenges	  in	  food	  security.	  	  Traditional	  value	  chain	  analysis	  and	  food	  security	  assessments	  do	  not	  consider	  a	  country’s	  international	  trade	  network	  when	  calculating	  the	  food	  security	  levels	  of	  a	  country.	  	  This	  project	  focuses	  on	  wheat	  trade	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (MENA)	  region.2	  	  Wheat	  is	  highly	  consumed	  in	  the	  region,	  which	  is	  overall	  a	  net	  importer	  of	  the	  commodity.	  	  In	  addition,	  wheat	  has	  a	  cultural	  importance	  in	  the	  region—riots	  and	  civil	  unrest	  have	  often	  been	  tied	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  bread	  prices,	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  various	  subsidies	  of	  wheat	  and	  wheat	  products	  demonstrate	  the	  importance	  of	  making	  this	  commodity	  available	  to	  the	  population.	  	  However,	  the	  region	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  a	  net-­‐importer	  of	  this	  commodity.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  we	  cannot	  use	  traditional	  mechanisms	  of	  food	  security	  assessments,	  which	  generally	  focus	  on	  domestic	  production.	  	  Instead,	  assessments	  of	  the	  security	  of	  the	  wheat	  supply	  in	  most	  MENA	  countries	  should	  consider	  international	  trade	  indicators.	  	  	  This	  project	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  existing	  international	  trade	  indicators	  used	  by	  food	  security	  organizations,	  and	  then	  adds	  to	  this	  body	  of	  knowledge	  by	  assessing	  the	  global	  wheat	  network	  using	  new	  tools	  developed	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Social	  Network	  Analysis.	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  project	  will	  focus	  on	  export	  bans	  that	  affected	  the	  global	  availability	  and	  price	  of	  wheat	  during	  the	  period	  of	  2005-­‐2010.	  	  Extra	  attention	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  MENA	  countries’	  reactions	  to	  these	  bans,	  to	  understand	  how	  some	  net-­‐importing	  countries	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  supplies	  but	  others	  were	  not.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Algeria,	  Bahrain,	  Djibouti,	  Egypt,	  Iran,	  Iraq,	  Jordan,	  Kuwait,	  Lebanon,	  Libya,	  Malta,	  Morocco,	  Oman,	  Qatar,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Sudan,	  Syria,	  Tunisia,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza,	  and	  Yemen.	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  Policy	  makers	  will	  find	  this	  analysis	  most	  useful	  for	  improving	  understanding	  of	  food	  security	  assessment	  methodology	  for	  food-­‐importing	  countries.	  	  The	  portion	  of	  this	  project	  which	  analyzes	  the	  results	  of	  the	  export	  bans	  on	  importing	  countries’	  wheat	  supplies	  are	  also	  relevant	  to	  understanding	  the	  effects	  of	  barriers	  to	  trade,	  such	  as	  export	  taxes	  or	  embargoes,	  on	  net-­‐importing	  countries’	  supply	  levels.	  	  In	  the	  background	  statement,	  Section	  A	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  global	  wheat	  trade,	  including	  state-­‐trading	  enterprises,	  major	  transnational	  companies,	  and	  global	  price	  transmission.	  This	  section	  also	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  export	  restrictions	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  net-­‐importing	  countries.	  	  Next,	  Section	  B	  focuses	  on	  wheat	  trade	  in	  the	  MENA	  region,	  noting	  both	  specific	  vulnerabilities	  and	  risks,	  as	  well	  as	  attempts	  to	  address	  these	  risks	  through	  subsidies	  and	  trade	  agreements.	  	  Finally,	  Sections	  C	  and	  D	  take	  a	  look	  at	  food	  security	  analysis	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  and	  existing	  food	  security	  indicators	  that	  consider	  international	  trade.	  	  In	  the	  data	  and	  methodology	  section,	  Social	  Network	  Analysis	  methods	  are	  presented	  as	  potential	  additional	  methods	  relevant	  to	  food	  security	  analysis	  for	  net-­‐importing	  countries.	  	  Specific	  indicators	  that	  are	  most	  relevant	  to	  trade	  analysis	  are	  described.	  The	  findings	  section	  presents	  first	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  global	  wheat	  network	  in	  general,	  noting	  trends	  in	  certain	  relevant	  indicators.	  	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  key	  players	  of	  the	  network	  in	  terms	  of	  node-­‐specific	  indicators,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  movements	  of	  MENA	  countries	  in	  the	  rankings.	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  last	  section	  takes	  an	  in-­‐depth	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look	  at	  changes	  in	  supply,	  trading	  partners,	  and	  centrality	  measures	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  as	  a	  response	  to	  trade	  bans	  in	  the	  years	  2005-­‐2010.	  	  Conclusions	  summarize	  findings	  and	  point	  out	  further	  opportunities	  for	  research.	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Section	  1:	  Background	  	  
A.	  Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  This	  section	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  big	  players	  in	  global	  wheat	  trade	  both	  in	  the	  government	  and	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  This	  section	  also	  speculates	  about	  the	  transmission	  of	  global	  price	  to	  local	  price	  in	  the	  wheat	  market,	  and	  finally	  addresses	  export	  bans—why	  exporting	  countries	  implement	  them	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  importing	  countries.	  
I.	  State-­‐Trading	  Enterprises	  The	  Uruguay	  Roundtable	  defines	  State-­‐Trading	  Enterprises	  (STE’s)	  as:	  	  
“Governmental	   and	   non-­‐governmental	   enterprises,	   including	   marketing	  
boards,	   which	   have	   been	   granted	   exclusive	   or	   special	   rights	   or	   privileges,	  
including	   statutory	   or	   constitutional	   powers,	   in	   the	   exercise	   of	   which	   they	  
influence	  through	  their	  purchases	  or	  sales	   the	   level	  or	  direction	  of	   imports	  or	  
exports.”3	  	   In	  the	  agriculture	  industry,	  these	  are	  typically	  statutory	  marketing	  boards.	  Goals	  of	  these	  boards	  include	  protection	  for	  domestic	  producers	  and	  price	  stabilization	  for	  consumers.4	  	  In	  the	  1970s,	  STE's	  controlled	  90%	  of	  wheat	  imports.	  In	  1996,	  the	  number	  was	  down	  to	  73%	  of	  imports	  and	  40%	  of	  exports.	  5,6	  Reforms	  of	  many	  of	  these	  markets	  were	  tied	  to	  World	  Bank	  loans	  or	  political	  intervention	  from	  developed	  countries.	  STEs	  in	  Canada	  and	  Australia	  control	  all	  their	  grain	  exports,	  accounting	  for	  24%	  of	  the	  world	  exports	  of	  wheat.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  The	  Results	  of	  the	  Uruguay	  Round	  of	  Multilateral	  Trade	  Negotiations:	  The	  Legal	  Texts,	  1994,	  pp.	  509-­‐511.	  4	  Ackerman,	  Karen	  Z,	  and	  M	  Dixit	  Praveen.	  “An	  Introduction	  to	  Trading	  in	  Agriculture.”	  USDA	  Market	  and	  
Trade	  Economics	  Division,	  Economic	  Research	  Service	  783	  (2014):	  141.	  5	  Young,	  Linda	  M.	  “Prevalence	  and	  Reform	  of	  State	  Trading	  Importers	  in	  World	  Grain	  Markets.”	  Trade	  
Research	  Center,	  Montana	  State	  University	  32	  (1999):	  n.	  pag.	  Print.	  6	  Ackerman,	  Karen	  Z,	  and	  M	  Dixit	  Praveen.	  “An	  Introduction	  to	  State	  Trading	  in	  Agriculture.”	  USDA	  Market	  and	  
Trade	  Economics	  Division,	  Economic	  Research	  Service	  783	  (2014):	  141.	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The	  level	  of	  monopolistic	  control,	  the	  range	  of	  products	  controlled,	  the	  market	  for	  the	  commodity,	  distance	  from	  the	  government,	  trade	  orientation	  and	  the	  policies	  the	  STE	  uses	  can	  all	  affect	  the	  amount	  of	  influence	  the	  STE	  has.	  	  	  For	  example,	  export	  oriented	  STE’s	  can	  use	  their	  rights	  and	  privileges	  to	  cross	  subsidize	  export	  sales,	  use	  domestic	  price	  pooling,	  or	  create	  discriminatory	  long-­‐term	  agreements	  with	  importing	  countries.	  	  Importing	  STE’s	  can	  set	  import	  amounts	  and	  can	  discriminate	  on	  the	  allocation	  of	  tariff	  rate	  quotas,	  grades	  and	  standards.7	  Various	  market	  failures	  in	  the	  industry	  can	  justify	  the	  monopolistic	  behaviors	  of	  STEs.	  	   There	  is	  movement	  to	  make	  STEs	  more	  open	  and	  cooperative	  with	  the	  private	  sector.	  Several	  MENA	  countries	  reformed	  their	  STE’s	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  World	  Bank	  funding.	  	  However,	  even	  after	  reform,	  Egypt’s	  STE,	  the	  General	  Authority	  for	  Supplies	  and	  Commodities,	  still	  controls	  70%	  of	  its	  wheat	  imports.	  	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  market,	  private	  firms	  may	  step	  in	  when	  an	  STE	  is	  reformed.	  	  In	  Africa,	  a	  lack	  of	  available	  credit	  inhibited	  private	  enterprises’	  ability	  to	  take	  the	  place	  of	  STE’s.	  	  However,	  in	  Asia	  private	  firms	  did	  move	  in	  when	  STE’s	  were	  reformed,	  and	  this	  allowed	  greater	  return	  to	  investors.8	  	  
II.	  Transnational	  Companies	  The	  other	  big	  players	  in	  the	  grain	  industry	  are	  transnational	  companies.	  	  The	  biggest	  ones	  are	  known	  as	  the	  ABCD's:	  Archer	  Daniels	  Midland	  (ADM),	  Bunge,	  Cargill,	  and	  Louis	  Dreyfus.	  	  In	  2013,	  Louis	  Dreyfus	  handled	  15%	  of	  global	  grain	  exports,	  while	  Cargill	  exported	  35%	  of	  US	  grain	  and	  25%	  of	  Argentina’s	  grain.	  	  	  Unlike	  STEs,	  which	  are	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  “Agricultural	  State	  Trading	  Enterprises	  and	  Developing	  Countries:	  Some	  Issues	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  the	  WTO	  Negotiations.”	  FAO	  Papers	  on	  Selected	  Issues	  Relating	  to	  the	  WTO	  Negotiations	  on	  Agriculture	  (2002):	  89–115.	  Print.	  8	  ibid.	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vertically	  integrated	  and	  only	  deal	  with	  the	  trade	  component	  of	  the	  commodity,	  these	  firms	  are	  vertically	  integrated	  and	  often	  deal	  with:	  production,	  storage	  (in	  both	  importing	  and	  exporting	  countries),	  shipping,	  and	  financing.	  	  The	  ABCDs	  have	  also	  assumed	  the	  role	  of	  banks	  by	  becoming	  involved	  in	  futures	  trading.	  	  	   Scoppola	  (2007)	  presents	  a	  game	  theory	  model	  of	  what	  would	  cause	  the	  switch	  between	  STE	  to	  private	  firm	  dominated	  exports	  for	  a	  country—changes	  in	  transaction	  costs	  or	  fixed	  costs,	  differentiation	  of	  the	  commodity,	  or	  competition	  by	  price	  instead	  of	  quantity.9	  	  	  
III.	  Global	  Price	  Transmission	  The	  global	  price	  of	  a	  commodity	  can	  affect	  its	  local	  price	  in	  varying	  degrees,	  depending	  on	  the	  commodity.	  	  Minot	  (2011)	  found	  that	  transmission	  from	  global	  to	  domestic	  prices	  occurs	  more	  often	  when	  (a)	  the	  commodity	  is	  more	  highly	  trade-­‐able	  and	  (b)	  the	  country	  is	  more	  import-­‐dependent	  on	  this	  commodity.10	  	  For	  example,	  in	  Africa	  domestic	  prices	  of	  plantains	  and	  maize	  are	  less	  correlated	  with	  global	  prices	  because	  they	  less	  often	  internationally	  traded	  and	  more	  often	  domestically	  produced.	  However,	  rice,	  which	  is	  more	  often	  internationally	  traded,	  exhibits	  a	  higher	  correlation	  between	  domestic	  and	  local	  prices.	  	  In	  the	  MENA	  region,	  domestic	  prices	  of	  wheat	  are	  transmitted	  from	  global	  prices	  because	  with	  it	  is	  a	  highly	  tradable	  good.	  In	  addition,	  domestic	  wheat	  prices	  will	  be	  more	  highly	  correlated	  with	  global	  prices	  in	  the	  countries	  that	  produce	  less	  wheat.	  Minot	  also	  finds	  that	  local	  prices	  change	  more	  than	  the	  global	  price	  in	  countries	  where	  domestic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Scoppola,	  Margherita.	  “Economies	  of	  Scale	  and	  Market	  Structure	  in	  International	  Grain	  Trade.”	  Agricultural	  
Economics	  37	  (2007):	  277–291.	  Print.	  10	  Minot,	  Nicholas.	  “Transmission	  of	  World	  Food	  Price	  Changes	  to	  Markets	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.”	  IFPRI	  
Discussion	  Paper	  01059	  (2011):	  n.	  pag.	  Print.	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policies	  or	  production	  fluctuations	  could	  play	  a	  role.	  	  Middle	  Eastern	  countries,	  which	  have	  a	  high	  level	  of	  government-­‐created	  market	  distortions,	  fall	  into	  this	  category.	  	  	  	  
IV.	  Export	  Restrictions	  and	  Net-­‐Importing	  Countries	  Governments	  in	  net-­‐exporting	  countries	  enact	  export	  restrictions	  to	  keep	  domestic	  prices	  low.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  2007	  a	  political	  justification	  for	  India’s	  export	  ban	  was	  that	  it	  would	  maintain	  low	  and	  stable	  domestic	  food	  prices.11	  	  Another	  justification	  for	  export	  bans	  is	  that	  they	  allow	  a	  country	  to	  maintain	  adequate	  buffer	  stocks	  to	  protect	  against	  future	  shocks.	  	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  2008	  food	  crisis,	  Russia	  increased	  export	  taxes	  to	  combat	  a	  rapidly	  falling	  stocks-­‐to-­‐use	  ratio.12	  Usually	  these	  restrictions	  benefit	  net-­‐exporting	  countries.13	  	  For	  net-­‐importing	  countries,	  however,	  these	  bans	  can	  be	  detrimental	  and	  cause	  a	  government	  to	  take	  drastic	  steps	  to	  maintain	  the	  necessary	  food	  supply.	  	  First,	  a	  period	  of	  “panic	  purchasing”	  may	  occur	  in	  the	  months	  before	  the	  ban	  is	  enacted.	  	  For	  example,	  prior	  to	  an	  export	  ban	  on	  rice	  cut	  the	  Philippines	  from	  several	  of	  their	  trading	  partners,	  the	  government	  imported	  1.3	  million	  metric	  tons	  of	  rice	  in	  2008,	  surpassing	  their	  total	  imports	  from	  2007.14	  	  	  After	  panic	  purchasing,	  most	  countries	  either	  find	  new	  trading	  partners	  or	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  current	  partners.	  	  Often,	  countries	  respond	  by	  relaxing	  certain	  restrictions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Dorosh,	  Paul	  A.;	  Shahidur	  Rashid.	  (2013).	  Trade	  subsidies,	  export	  bans	  and	  price	  stabilization:	  Lessons	  of	  bangladesh-­‐india	  rice	  trade	  in	  the	  2000s.	  Food	  Policy,	  41,	  103.	  12	  Dollive,	  K.	  (2008).	  The	  impact	  of	  export	  restraints	  on	  rising	  grain	  prices	  No.	  2008-­‐09-­‐A).	  Washington,	  DC:	  United	  States	  International	  Trade	  Comission.	  13	  Laborde	  Debucquet,	  D.,	  &	  Bouët,	  A.	  (2012).	  Food	  crisis	  and	  export	  taxation:	  The	  cost	  of	  non-­‐cooperative	  trade	  policies.	  Review	  of	  World	  Economics,	  148(1),	  209-­‐233.	  doi:10.1007/s10290-­‐011-­‐0108-­‐8	  14	  Headey,	  D.	  (2011).	  Rethinking	  the	  global	  food	  crisis:	  The	  role	  of	  trade	  shocks.	  Food	  Policy,	  36(2),	  136-­‐146.	  doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2010.10.003	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such	  as	  quotas,	  regulations,	  and	  tariffs.	  15,16	  For	  example,	  after	  Argentina’s	  export	  ban	  of	  wheat	  in	  2007,	  Brazil	  replaced	  its	  85%	  market	  share	  of	  imports	  from	  Argentina	  by	  increasing	  imports	  from	  other	  nations	  in	  MERCOSUR	  (the	  Latin	  American	  customs	  group),	  Canada	  and	  the	  US.	  	  To	  achieve	  this,	  Brazil	  reduced	  import	  tariffs	  on	  non-­‐Mercosur	  imports,	  and	  relaxed	  import	  quotas.	  17	  	  South	  Korea	  was	  also	  affected	  by	  an	  export	  ban,	  on	  Chinese	  maize.	  	  The	  government	  diversified	  by	  starting	  a	  new	  trading	  relationship	  with	  Indonesia	  and	  increasing	  US	  imports	  drastically.	  18	  	  A	  final	  strategy	  for	  importing	  countries	  is	  to	  tap	  into	  their	  buffer	  stocks.	  	  This	  short-­‐term	  strategy	  is	  typically	  coupled	  with	  other	  coping	  mechanisms.	  	  For	  example,	  Bangladesh	  released	  702,000	  metric	  tons	  of	  rice	  to	  local	  markets	  to	  maintain	  adequate	  supply	  and	  low	  prices	  during	  the	  crisis	  of	  2008.	  19	  	  Export	  restrictions	  serve	  their	  purpose	  in	  keeping	  supplies	  high	  and	  domestic	  prices	  low	  for	  net-­‐exporting	  countries,	  but	  they	  greatly	  impact	  net-­‐importing	  countries’	  prices	  and	  supplies.	  	  For	  example,	  after	  export	  bans	  put	  in	  place	  by	  Russia	  and	  the	  Ukraine	  in	  2007,	  demand	  for	  US	  wheat	  increased	  drastically.	  	  The	  US	  price	  increased	  by	  70%	  in	  3	  months	  and	  US	  exports	  nearly	  doubled.	  20	  Export	  bans	  also	  adversely	  effect	  total	  global	  supply	  of	  the	  commodity,	  and	  often	  impact	  real	  national	  income	  of	  net-­‐importing	  countries.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Laborde	  Debucquet,	  D.,	  &	  Bouët,	  A.	  (2012).	  Food	  crisis	  and	  export	  taxation:	  The	  cost	  of	  non-­‐cooperative	  trade	  policies.	  Review	  of	  World	  Economics,	  148(1),	  209-­‐233.	  doi:10.1007/s10290-­‐011-­‐0108-­‐8	  16	  Dollive,	  K.	  (2008).	  The	  impact	  of	  export	  restraints	  on	  rising	  grain	  prices	  No.	  2008-­‐09-­‐A).	  Washington,	  DC:	  United	  States	  International	  Trade	  Comission.	  17	  Ibid	  18	  Ibid	  19	  Dorosh,	  Paul	  A.;	  Shahidur	  Rashid.	  (2013).	  Trade	  subsidies,	  export	  bans	  and	  price	  stabilization:	  Lessons	  of	  bangladesh-­‐india	  rice	  trade	  in	  the	  2000s.	  Food	  Policy,	  41,	  103.	  20	  According	  to	  Bouet	  (2011),	  wheat	  markets	  are	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  export	  restrictions.	  	  He	  estimates	  that	  export	  restrictions	  on	  wheat	  can	  lead	  to	  additional	  world	  price	  increases	  of	  16.8%.	  	  	  When	  net	  importers	  react	  by	  reducing	  import	  tariffs,	  the	  price	  increases	  by	  an	  additional	  28.3%.	  	  Both	  export	  restrictions	  and	  import	  tariff	  reductions	  combined	  can	  increase	  wheat	  prices	  by	  up	  to	  41.1%.	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Bouet	  (2011)	  estimated	  that,	  Egypt	  and	  East	  Africa’s	  real	  national	  incomes	  were	  reduced	  by	  .85%	  and	  .37%,	  respectively,	  because	  of	  export	  restrictions.	  
B.	  The	  Wheat	  Market	  in	  the	  MENA	  Region	  	  This	  section	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  wheat	  trade	  in	  the	  MENA	  region:	  market	  distortions	  such	  as	  subsidies	  and	  tariffs,	  vulnerabilities	  and	  risks	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  attempts	  to	  mitigate	  this	  risk	  through	  bilateral	  trade	  agreements	  as	  well	  as	  technology	  development	  to	  increase	  production.	  	  	  



















Table 2: Wheat in the MENA Region	
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The	  Middle	  East	  is	  the	  largest	  net	  importing	  region	  of	  cereals,	  purchasing	  approximately	  27%	  of	  all	  globally	  traded	  wheat.	  21	  22	  On	  average,	  the	  region	  imports	  40%	  of	  the	  wheat	  it	  consumes,	  with	  some	  countries	  such	  as	  Libya	  importing	  up	  to	  90%.23	  Top	  ten	  exporters	  of	  wheat	  to	  the	  MENA	  region	  are:	  Argentina,	  Australia,	  Canada,	  France,	  Germany,	  Kazakhstan,	  Russia,	  Turkey,	  Ukraine	  and	  USA.	  	  As	  the	  average	  cost	  of	  wheat	  increases,	  global	  price	  volatility	  is	  also	  rising.	  	  The	  increase	  in	  price	  volatility	  is	  due	  to	  several	  factors,	  including	  an	  increasing	  demand	  for	  biofuels,	  fluctuation	  in	  oil	  prices,	  depreciation	  of	  the	  US	  dollar	  relative	  to	  other	  currencies,	  and	  rising	  commodity	  speculation.24	  
I.	  Market	  Distortions	  Wheat	  has	  a	  cultural	  importance	  in	  the	  region,	  where	  37%	  of	  daily	  caloric	  consumption	  is	  wheat	  products.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  government	  involvement	  in	  both	  the	  domestic	  production	  industry	  and	  the	  price	  of	  the	  imported	  commodity	  is	  strong,	  distorting	  the	  market	  through	  price	  controls	  or	  subsidies.	  	  Overall,	  the	  MENA	  region	  is	  considered	  highly	  protective	  of	  agricultural	  activities,	  scoring	  higher	  than	  the	  global	  average	  on	  several	  indicators	  for	  agricultural	  protection.25	  	  Some	  examples	  of	  protectionist	  production	  policies	  utilized	  in	  the	  region	  include	  procurement	  price	  floors,	  guaranteed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Wright,	  Brian,	  and	  Carlo	  Cafiero.	  2011.	  “Grain	  Reserves	  and	  Food	  Security	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa.”	  Food	  Security	  3	  (S1)	  (February	  12):	  61–76.	  doi:10.1007/s12571-­‐010-­‐0094-­‐z.	  http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12571-­‐010-­‐0094-­‐z.	  22	  FAO,	  2013.	  FAOSTAT	  Database	  on	  Agriculture.	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (FAO).	  Rome,	  Italy.	  23	  Larson,	  Donald	  F.	  2012.	  “Food	  Security	  and	  Storage	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa.”	  World	  Bank	  Policy	  Paper	  (April).	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2035787.	  24	  The	  World	  Bank	  and	  FAO	  (2012).	  The	  Grain	  Chain:	  Food	  Security	  and	  Managing	  Wheat	  	  Imports	  in	  Arab	  Countries.	  Washington	  DC,	  The	  World	  Bank	  and	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  25	  ibid,	  10.	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purchase	  prices,	  import	  tariffs	  reflecting	  the	  Cost,	  Insurance	  and	  Freight	  (CIF)	  price,	  and	  value-­‐added	  taxes	  (VAT)	  which	  are	  dependent	  on	  end	  use.26	  	  In	  addition,	  intra-­‐country	  trade	  in	  the	  region	  is	  more	  costly	  than	  trade	  between	  the	  MENA	  region	  and	  Europe.	  	  The	  reasons	  for	  these	  high	  costs	  include:	  non-­‐tariff	  restrictions	  between	  MENA	  regions;	  underperforming	  and	  disrupted	  logistics	  services	  between	  countries;	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  coordination	  in	  intraregional	  infrastructure.	  	  Fragmented	  coordination	  stems	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  of	  the	  standards	  or	  origin	  of	  products,	  particularly	  because	  the	  Pan	  Arab	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  removes	  tariffs	  on	  goods	  of	  Arab	  origin.27	  	  Since	  most	  countries	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  are	  net-­‐importers	  of	  wheat,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  shock	  in	  the	  market,	  governments	  focus	  their	  protectionist	  measures	  on	  demand	  side	  dynamics.	  	  	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  Jordan	  revived	  food	  subsidies	  they	  had	  recently	  cut,	  and	  initiated	  tax	  exemptions	  on	  13	  food	  items.28	  Various	  subsidies	  on	  flour	  and	  bread	  in	  Egypt,	  Jordan,	  and	  Morocco	  also	  keep	  demand	  high	  and	  prices	  artificially	  low.29	  30	  Research	  shows	  that	  many	  of	  these	  subsidies,	  such	  as	  those	  on	  retail	  food	  in	  urban	  markets	  in	  Egypt,	  imported	  materials	  for	  food	  processing,	  and	  fuel	  for	  transport	  and	  irrigation	  in	  Yemen,	  disproportionately	  assist	  those	  with	  a	  higher	  socio-­‐economic	  status.31	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  “Policies	  for	  Basic	  Food	  Commodities.”	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  (2005):	  n.	  pag.	  Print.	  27	  “Using	  Trade	  Policy	  to	  Overcome	  Food	  Insecurity.”	  Global	  Monitoring	  Report	  2012:	  Food	  Prices,	  Nutrition,	  
and	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals.	  World	  Bank,	  2012.	  117–134.	  28	  ibid,	  125.	  29	  Obeidat,	  Omar.	  “Bakery	  Owners	  Reject	  Smart	  Card	  Plan	  to	  Regulate	  Bread	  Subsidy.”	  The	  Jordan	  Times	  28	  Aug.	  2013.	  30	  Wallace,	  Stuart.	  “Morocco	  Buys	  160,000	  Tons	  of	  Local	  Wheat	  for	  Flour	  Supply.”	  Bloomberg	  6	  Aug.	  2013	  :	  n.	  pag.	  Print.	  31	  Breisinger,	  Clemens,	  Claudia	  Ringler,	  Catherine	  Aragon,	  and	  Olivier	  Ecker.	  2010.	  “Food	  Security	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  Current	  State	  and	  Future	  Perspectives.”	  p42.	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II.	  Vulnerabilities	  and	  Risks	  Sadler,	  et	  al	  divide	  the	  risks	  faced	  by	  the	  MENA	  region	  grain	  market	  into	  three	  types,	  and	  propose	  relevant	  solutions	  to	  each.32	  	  First,	  physical	  availability	  of	  grain	  is	  threatened	  by	  global	  weather	  patterns	  or	  infestations.	  	  Declining	  global	  stocks	  and	  increasing	  consumption	  have	  intensified	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  risk.	  	  Stockpiling,	  through	  the	  public	  or	  private	  sector,	  and	  overseas	  or	  domestically,	  could	  address	  this	  risk	  but	  may	  do	  so	  at	  a	  high	  cost.	  Saudi	  Arabia	  is	  following	  this	  track.	  The	  country	  aims	  to	  be	  100%	  dependent	  on	  wheat	  imports	  by	  2016	  in	  order	  to	  save	  water.	  	  They’ve	  signed	  deals	  to	  build	  new	  wheat	  silos	  and	  mills	  at	  Jazan	  Port,	  which	  will	  raise	  storage	  capacity	  to	  three	  million	  tons	  of	  wheat,	  meeting	  annual	  consumption.33	  	   Counterparty	  risks	  include	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  trade	  partner	  will	  fail	  to	  deliver	  the	  agreed-­‐upon	  quantity	  at	  the	  agreed-­‐upon	  price.	  	  These	  risks	  will	  be	  impacted	  by	  both	  commercial	  factors	  such	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  secure	  freight	  at	  the	  proper	  rate,	  and	  non-­‐commercial	  factors	  such	  as	  a	  natural	  disaster	  or	  conflict	  disrupting	  the	  planned	  transaction.	  	  A	  recent	  relevant	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  Gulf	  Wars	  in	  Iraq,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  disruption	  of	  both	  wheat	  imports	  and	  domestic	  production.	  	  These	  risks	  can	  be	  mitigated	  through	  spot	  purchasing	  or	  longer-­‐term	  contracts.	  	  	  Finally,	  grain	  trade	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  price	  risk,	  as	  raw	  prices	  and	  volatility	  continue	  to	  increase	  since	  2000.	  	  With	  climate	  change’s	  adverse	  effect	  on	  production,	  and	  as	  well	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Sadler,	  Marc,	  and	  Nicholas	  Magnan.	  2011.	  “Grain	  Import	  Dependency	  in	  the	  MENA	  Region:	  Risk	  Management	  Options.”	  Food	  Security	  3	  (S1)	  (February	  12):	  77–89.	  doi:10.1007/s12571-­‐010-­‐0095-­‐y.	  http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12571-­‐010-­‐0095-­‐y.	  33	  Khan,	  Ghazanfar	  Ali.	  2013.	  “Pioneering	  Saudi	  Farm	  Techniques	  Bear	  Fruit.”	  Arabnews.com,	  September	  23.	  http://www.arabnews.com/news/465523.	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continued	  growing	  populations	  and	  rising	  consumption,	  price	  risk	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  decreasing.	  Some	  options	  to	  mitigate	  price	  risk	  include	  futures	  and	  options	  trading,	  and	  forward	  contracts.	  	  More	  domestic	  growth	  or	  stockpiling	  will	  also	  mitigate	  this	  risk.	  	  The	  World	  Bank	  advises	  against	  increased	  domestic	  growth,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  consider	  it	  the	  most	  efficient	  alternative	  for	  the	  region.34	  	  Strategic	  moves	  such	  as	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  increased	  capacity	  for	  stockpiling	  imported	  grain	  and	  Gulf	  countries’	  foreign	  investment	  in	  agricultural	  development	  in	  partner	  countries,	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  most	  MENA	  countries	  are	  following	  this	  advice.	  	  Export	  restrictions	  increase	  all	  three	  types	  of	  the	  risks	  listed	  above.35	  For	  example,	  in	  2008,	  the	  following	  countries	  instigated	  exports	  bans	  on	  grain:	  Argentina,	  India,	  Kazakhstan,	  Pakistan,	  Ukraine,	  Russia,	  and	  Vietnam.	  	  These	  restrictions	  limited	  the	  availability	  of	  grain,	  led	  to	  a	  temporary	  loss	  of	  trade	  partners,	  and	  raised	  prices.	  	  Potential	  paths	  to	  mitigating	  this	  risk	  is	  for	  net-­‐importing	  countries	  to	  form	  agreements	  with	  major	  exporters	  to	  ensure	  preferential	  treatment	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  food	  export	  ban,	  or	  to	  use	  political	  pressure	  to	  outlaw	  such	  export	  bans	  in	  the	  future.	  	  IFPRI	  notes	  that	  reliance	  on	  oil	  exports	  makes	  the	  region’s	  food	  security	  more	  tenuous—fluctuations	  in	  the	  market	  for	  oil	  can	  affect	  oil-­‐exporting	  countries’	  ability	  to	  purchase	  sufficient	  wheat.36	  Crude	  price	  fluctuations	  will	  have	  diverse	  effects	  on	  countries	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  depending	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  produce	  oil.	  	  For	  energy-­‐exporters,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  “MENA	  Region:	  Agriculture	  and	  Rural	  Development.”	  World	  Bank	  Group	  (2008):	  n.	  pag.	  Web.	  7	  Nov.	  2013.	  35	  ibid.	  36	  Breisinger,	  Clemens,	  Claudia	  Ringler,	  Catherine	  Aragon,	  and	  Olivier	  Ecker.	  2010.	  “Food	  Security	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  Current	  State	  and	  Future	  Perspectives.”	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rising	  prices	  of	  fuel	  can	  balance	  the	  rising	  price	  of	  food	  on	  the	  global	  level.	  	  However,	  those	  in	  mineral	  rich	  countries	  who	  are	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  fuel	  market	  will	  disproportionately	  feel	  the	  impacts	  of	  rising	  prices	  of	  food.	  Furthermore,	  MENA	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  produce	  oil	  face	  a	  doubled	  risk	  when	  rising	  fuel	  prices	  are	  coupled	  with	  rising	  food	  prices.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  grain,	  where	  transportation	  costs	  are	  often	  higher	  than	  actual	  commodity	  prices.37	  	  	  
III.	  Trade	  Agreements	  and	  other	  Efforts	  at	  Increasing	  Food	  Security	  In	  recent	  years,	  MENA	  countries	  have	  become	  more	  active	  in	  the	  global	  food	  policy	  discussion.	  Qatar’s	  National	  Food	  Security	  Programme	  has	  taken	  the	  lead	  in	  innovative	  research	  and	  development	  to	  combat	  water	  scarcity,	  and	  in	  the	  policy	  arena	  by	  creating	  the	  Global	  Dry	  Land	  Alliance	  in	  2012,	  a	  treaty-­‐based	  alliance	  among	  countries	  who	  face	  extreme	  dry	  land	  challenges.38	  	  The	  alliance’s	  goals	  are	  to	  solve	  common	  food	  security	  problems	  by	  sharing	  knowledge	  and	  best	  practices,	  provide	  assistance	  in	  times	  of	  need,	  fund	  technological	  research	  and	  innovation,	  and	  plan	  for	  food	  crisis	  responses.	  	  Bilateral	  trade	  agreements	  are	  in	  process	  in	  with	  many	  of	  the	  major	  exporters	  of	  wheat	  to	  the	  region.	  The	  EU	  has	  signed	  free	  trade	  agreements	  (FTAs)	  with	  Tunisia,	  Israel,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Sadler,	  Marc,	  and	  Nicholas	  Magnan.	  2011.	  “Grain	  Import	  Dependency	  in	  the	  MENA	  Region:	  Risk	  Management	  Options.”	  Food	  Security	  3	  (S1)	  (February	  12):	  77–89.	  doi:10.1007/s12571-­‐010-­‐0095-­‐y.	  http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12571-­‐010-­‐0095-­‐y,	  p86.	  38	  “UN	  Secretary	  General	  Ban	  Ki-­‐Moon	  Pledges	  Full	  Support	  to	  Qatar	  for	  Establishing	  the	  Global	  Dry	  Land	  Alliance	  (GDLA).”	  2012.	  Qatar	  National	  Food	  Security	  Programme.	  http://www.prnewswire.com/news-­‐releases/un-­‐secretary-­‐general-­‐ban-­‐ki-­‐moon-­‐pledges-­‐full-­‐support-­‐to-­‐qatar-­‐for-­‐establishing-­‐the-­‐global-­‐dry-­‐land-­‐alliance-­‐gdla-­‐160124985.html.	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Morocco,	  Jordan,	  Egypt,	  Algeria,	  Lebanon	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority.39	  	  The	  US	  has	  signed	  FTAs	  with	  Morocco,	  Jordan,	  Israel,	  the	  UAE,	  Bahrain	  and	  Oman.	  	  The	  Bush	  administration	  began	  plans	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  Middle	  East	  FTA	  (MEFTA),	  with	  a	  deadline	  of	  2013,	  but	  this	  agenda	  has	  not	  been	  continued	  by	  the	  Obama	  administration.	  	  Currently,	  Egypt	  is	  in	  negotiations	  with	  Russia	  and	  Mercosur	  (a	  customs	  union	  between	  Latin	  American	  countries	  which	  include	  Argentina,	  a	  major	  exporter	  of	  wheat).	  The	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council	  (GCC)40	  is	  also	  in	  negotiations	  with	  Australia,	  Russia,	  the	  EU	  and	  Mercosur.	  	  Regionally,	  MENA	  countries	  are	  members	  of	  the	  Greater	  Arab	  FTA	  (GAFTA),	  which	  began	  in	  1997	  and	  achieved	  the	  elimination	  of	  tariffs	  between	  members.	  	  The	  Agadir	  Agreement	  for	  the	  Establishment	  of	  a	  Free	  Trade	  Zone	  (2004)	  connects	  Mediterranean	  countries	  of	  Egypt,	  Jordan,	  Morocco	  and	  Tunisia.	  Egypt	  and	  Libya	  are	  also	  members	  of	  the	  Common	  Market	  of	  Eastern	  and	  Southern	  Africa	  (COMESA).	  	  As	  stated	  above,	  these	  agreements	  do	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  to	  efficient	  market	  structures.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  League	  of	  Arab	  States	  has	  proposed	  a	  monitoring	  mechanism	  that	  would	  track	  the	  global	  availability	  of	  grains	  and	  other	  commodities,	  as	  well	  as	  locate	  the	  needed	  quantities	  of	  assistance	  in	  a	  crisis.	  	  Gulf	  states	  have	  invested	  in	  countries	  not	  known	  for	  their	  food	  export	  capacity	  but	  who	  serve	  as	  natural	  partners	  due	  to	  physical	  proximity,	  political	  connections	  or	  cultural	  similarities.	  	  These	  include	  Pakistan,	  Sudan	  and	  Ethiopia.	  	  While	  Pakistan	  now	  contributes	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  rice	  to	  the	  region,	  other	  countries	  have	  yet	  to	  provide	  returns	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Khouri,	  R	  Al.	  “EU	  and	  US	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa.”	  Carnegie	  Middle	  East	  
Center	  8	  (2008):	  n.	  pag.	  Web.	  26	  Nov.	  2013.	  40	  Bahrain,	  Kuwait,	  Oman,	  Qatar,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  and	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	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investment	  of	  agriculture	  development.41	  Several	  of	  these	  countries	  currently	  experience	  food	  scarcity	  themselves.	  	  Agro-­‐investments	  will	  prove	  helpful	  to	  Gulf	  States	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  “bread-­‐basket”	  option	  alone	  will	  not	  solve	  the	  food	  security	  issue	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  use	  of	  export	  barriers	  to	  protect	  domestic	  prices	  in	  the	  face	  of	  food	  crises,	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  agro-­‐investments	  alone	  will	  not	  guarantee	  food	  security.42	  	  	  	  	  Arab	  states	  will	  disproportionately	  feel	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change.43	  	  Qatar	  has	  attempted	  to	  combat	  the	  issue	  of	  water	  scarcity	  and	  climate	  change	  through	  innovative	  new	  techniques	  in	  hydroponics,	  desalinization	  and	  harnessing	  solar	  energy	  to	  gather	  more	  water.44	  	  While	  these	  new	  investments	  are	  exciting	  opportunities	  for	  alternative	  energy	  sources	  and	  new	  agricultural	  methods,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  that	  the	  entire	  region	  could	  benefit	  from	  or	  reproduce	  these	  methods	  at	  a	  large	  enough	  scale	  to	  remove	  susceptibility	  to	  food	  crises.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  ibid.	  42	  Woertz,	  Eckhart.	  2013.	  “Oil	  For	  Food:	  Big	  Business	  in	  The	  Middle	  East.”	  World	  Financial	  Review.	  http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=2773.	  43	  “Vulnerability	  and	  Adaptation	  of	  the	  Water	  Sector	  to	  Climate	  Change.”	  2013.	  UNDP:	  Water	  Governance	  
Program	  for	  Arab	  States.	  Accessed	  October	  20.	  http://www.wgpas-­‐undp.org/index.php/en/vulnerability-­‐and-­‐adaptation-­‐of-­‐the-­‐water-­‐sector-­‐to-­‐climate-­‐change.	  44	  TEDxSummit.	  2012.	  “Fahad	  Al-­‐Attiya:	  A	  Country	  with	  No	  Water.”	  http://www.ted.com/talks/fahad_al_attiya_a_country_with_no_water.html.	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Source: UN Comtrade (import quantities*), World Bank (price).  
*Djibouti excluded from import quantities because of incomplete information.  
C.	  Food	  Security	  in	  the	  MENA	  Region:	  Classifying	  and	  Analyzing	  the	  Risk	  This	  section	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  food	  security	  in	  the	  MENA	  region,	  and	  its	  diverse	  causes	  and	  effects	  on	  the	  citizens	  of	  MENA	  countries.	  	  The	  story	  of	  food	  insecurity	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  a	  story,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  of	  water	  scarcity.	  	  Since	  the	  1970s,	  the	  region	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  grow	  sufficient	  food	  to	  feed	  its	  growing	  population	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  water	  and	  arable	  land,	  and	  a	  rapidly	  increasing	  and	  urbanized	  population.	  	  Today,	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  dependent	  on	  food	  exporters	  like	  the	  US,	  Russia	  or	  Australia.	  45	  	  In	  2008,	  the	  region’s	  food	  imports	  totaled	  USD61.4	  billion	  (50%	  of	  its	  food	  requirement);	  this	  number	  is	  expected	  to	  grow	  to	  USD92.4	  billion	  by	  2020.46	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The	  most	  common	  categorization	  of	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  is	  by	  possession	  of	  energy	  resources.	  IFPRI	  categorizes	  food	  security	  challenged	  countries	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  by	  those	  that	  are	  resource-­‐rich:	  Algeria,	  Iraq,	  Libya,	  Sudan,	  Syria	  and	  Yemen;	  and	  those	  that	  are	  resource-­‐poor:	  Djibouti,	  Egypt,	  Jordan,	  Lebanon,	  Morocco,	  Tunisia,	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  territories.47	  	  Other	  categorizations,	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  1,	  also	  consider	  labor	  supply.	  
Table	  1:	  Classifying	  Food	  Security	  in	  the	  MENA	  Region	  by	  Labor	  and	  Resources	  
	  Some	  threats	  to	  food	  supply	  are	  purely	  political.	  	  Sanctions	  have	  typically	  resulted	  in	  a	  substitution	  effect,	  forcing	  countries	  to	  find	  new	  trading	  partners	  but	  not	  adversely	  affecting	  the	  food	  supply	  in	  a	  particularly	  grave	  manner.	  	  Sanctions	  are	  especially	  unsuccessful	  when	  placed	  on	  goods	  with	  multiple	  alternatives	  such	  as	  food.	  	  In	  the	  1975,	  for	  example,	  the	  US	  food	  embargo	  on	  OPEC	  countries	  in	  retaliation	  to	  the	  oil	  boycott	  that	  same	  year	  failed	  because	  of	  available	  alternate	  supplies	  of	  staple	  food	  products.	  	  By	  contrast,	  in	  the	  1990s,	  a	  UN	  embargo	  on	  Iraq	  caused	  approximately	  500,000	  deaths	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Breisinger,	  Clemens,	  Claudia	  Ringler,	  Catherine	  Aragon,	  and	  Olivier	  Ecker.	  2010.	  “Food	  Security	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  Current	  State	  and	  Future	  Perspectives.”	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instigated	  a	  policy	  change	  in	  neighboring	  Syria,	  promoting	  domestic	  wheat	  cultivation	  over	  importation.48	  	  Price	  shocks	  in	  the	  region	  are	  of	  particular	  concern	  in	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  violence	  in	  the	  region	  over	  increases	  in	  prices	  of	  staple	  goods	  during	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  and	  before.	  However,	  some	  researchers	  find	  a	  lack	  of	  statistically	  significant	  correlations	  between	  rising	  food	  prices	  and	  risk	  of	  increased	  political	  instability	  or	  violence.49	  	  	  In	  general,	  the	  debate	  continues	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  rising	  food	  prices	  on	  the	  poor—in	  countries	  with	  significant	  agricultural	  exports,	  rising	  food	  prices	  reduce	  poverty.	  	  However,	  in	  countries	  reliant	  on	  food	  imports,	  the	  opposite	  is	  true.	  	  MENA	  region	  countries	  are	  typically	  the	  latter.	  	  Research	  shows	  that	  a	  global	  increase	  in	  food	  and	  fuel	  prices	  will	  have	  negative	  effects	  on	  household	  nutrition	  levels,	  reduce	  expenditures	  on	  education	  and	  health	  services,	  lower	  remittances	  coming	  from	  Europe,	  increase	  unemployment,	  and	  reduce	  support	  given	  to	  refugees	  in	  the	  region.50	  	   With	  a	  problem	  as	  diverse	  in	  both	  its	  origin	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  region,	  there	  is	  no	  one	  silver	  bullet	  that	  will	  solve	  all	  the	  food	  security	  concerns	  in	  the	  MENA	  region.	  	  With	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  issues	  ranging	  from	  trade	  relations	  to	  climate	  change,	  from	  export	  barriers	  to	  water	  scarcity,	  and	  from	  obesity	  to	  malnutrition	  and	  hunger,	  there	  is	  no	  one	  solution	  that	  can	  assuage	  the	  concerns	  of	  all	  countries	  in	  the	  region.	  	  However,	  Eckart	  Woertz,	  senior	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  ibid,	  11.	  49	  Bazzi,	  Samuel,	  and	  Christopher	  Blattman.	  2011.	  “Economic	  Shocks	  and	  Conflict :	  The	  (Absence	  of ?)	  Evidence	  from	  Commodity	  Prices”.	  Washington	  DC.	  50	  Jones,	  Nicola,	  Caroline	  Harper,	  Sara	  Pantuliano,	  Sara	  Pavanello,	  Shreya	  Mitra,	  Katie	  Chalcraft,	  and	  Kim	  Kyunghoon.	  2009.	  “Impact	  of	  the	  Economic	  Crisis	  and	  Food	  and	  Fuel	  Price	  Volatility	  on	  Children	  and	  Women	  in	  the	  MENA	  Region	  in	  the	  MENA	  Region.”	  UNICEF.	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researcher	  on	  food	  security	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  at	  the	  Barcelona	  Centre	  for	  International	  Affairs,	  offers	  this	  analysis:	  “for	  the	  Middle	  East	  at	  large	  there	  is	  no	  way	  around	  food	  imports.	  
The	  challenge	  for	  resource	  poor	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  to	  finance	  them	  without	  oil;	  
the	  challenge	  for	  the	  resource	  rich	  countries	  of	  the	  region	  will	  be	  to	  finance	  them	  after	  oil.”51	  
D.	  Current	  Methodology	  for	  Food	  Security	  Analysis	  This	  section	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  food	  security	  and	  food	  security	  analysis,	  focusing	  on	  indicators	  that	  relate	  to	  international	  trade	  and	  a	  country’s	  ability	  to	  maintain	  sufficient	  imports.	  The	  most	  widely	  accepted	  definition	  of	  food	  security	  comes	  from	  the	  World	  Food	  Summit	  in	  1996.	  	  A	  place	  is	  food	  secure	  “when	  all	  people	  at	  all	  times	  have	  access	  to	  sufficient,	  safe,	  nutritious	  food	  to	  maintain	  a	  healthy	  and	  active	  life.”52	  There	  are	  three	  pillars	  to	  food	  security:	  1. Availability:	  There	  must	  be	  an	  adequate	  quantity	  of	  food	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  population.	  2. Access:	  The	  population	  must	  have	  sufficient	  resources	  to	  obtain	  the	  food,	  and	  no	  particular	  vulnerable	  group	  should	  be	  denied	  access	  to	  the	  food.	  3. Utilization:	  The	  population	  should	  have	  the	  knowledge	  to	  consume	  food	  in	  a	  safe	  way,	  being	  mindful	  of	  proper	  nutrition	  and	  sanitation.53	  	  This	  project	  focuses	  on	  availability,	  or	  the	  quantity	  of	  food	  present	  in	  the	  country.	  Analyzing	  availability	  involves	  understanding	  ability	  of	  a	  country	  to	  access	  food,	  but	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Woertz,	  Eckart.	  2011.	  “Arab	  Food,	  Water,	  and	  the	  Big	  Landgrab	  That	  Wasn’t.”	  Brown	  J.	  World	  Aff.	  1–17.	  http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-­‐cgi-­‐bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/brownjwa18&section=14.	  52	  “Food	  Security.”	  2013.	  WHO.	  Accessed	  October	  21.	  http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/.	  53	  ibid	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that	  of	  an	  individual	  household.	  	  Barriers	  for	  individuals	  to	  acquire	  food,	  lack	  of	  proper	  sanitation	  or	  knowledge	  of	  nutrition	  will	  not	  be	  considered	  in	  this	  project.	  	  	  Organizations	  such	  as	  FEWS	  NET	  (funded	  by	  USAID),	  the	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  (FAO),	  the	  World	  Food	  Programme	  (WFP),	  and	  the	  International	  Food	  Policy	  Research	  Institute	  (IFPRI)	  all	  conduct	  food	  security	  assessments,	  which	  range	  from	  ongoing	  monitoring	  of	  crop	  yields,	  local	  prices	  and	  buffer	  stocks,	  to	  one-­‐time	  emergency	  assessments	  post-­‐crisis.	  	  Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  is	  the	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit’s	  (EIU)	  ranking	  of	  a	  countries	  based	  on	  an	  index	  of	  27	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  food	  security	  indicators	  touching	  on	  food	  security	  in	  availability,	  affordability,	  quality	  and	  safety.54	  	  	  	  Some	  food	  security	  assessments	  incorporate	  the	  quantity	  of	  a	  country’s	  imports	  and	  exports	  into	  their	  calculations.	  	  For	  example,	  FAO	  calculates	  potential	  purchase	  power	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  purchase	  food	  imports	  with	  revenue	  from	  exports,	  or:	  	  
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 =    𝒇𝒐𝒐𝒅  𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆  𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  The	  27	  indicators	  are:	  Consumption	  as	  a	  share	  of	  household	  expenditure,	  Proportion	  of	  population	  under	  global	  poverty	  line,	  Gross	  domestic	  product	  per	  capita,	  Agricultural	  import	  tariffs,	  Presence	  of	  food	  safety	  net	  programs,	  Access	  to	  farmer	  financing,	  Availability,	  Sufficiency	  of	  supply,	  Public	  expenditure	  on	  agricultural	  R&D,	  Agricultural	  infrastructure,	  Volatility	  of	  agricultural	  production,	  Political	  instability,	  Corruption,	  Urban	  absorption	  capacity,	  Quality	  and	  safety,	  Diet	  diversification,	  Nutritional	  standards,	  Micronutrient	  availability,	  Protein	  quality,	  Food	  safety.	  	  The	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit.	  Global	  Food	  Security	  Index.	  2013.	  16	  August	  2013	  <http://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com/Home/Methodology>.	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This	  is	  similar	  to	  another	  indicator	  used	  by	  IFPRI	  called	  terms	  of	  trade,	  which	  measures	  the	  proportional	  change	  in	  the	  price	  of	  an	  imported	  commodity	  i	   𝑥! ∆!"!" ,  relative	  to	  the	  price	  of	  exports	   𝑥! ∆!!!! ,   of	  that	  same	  commodity.	  	  The	  “Terms	  of	  Trade	  Effect”	  also	  considers	  GDP	  and	  total	  value	  of	  imports	  (xi)	  and	  exports	  (mi)	  of	  commodity	  i.	  
𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔 − 𝒐𝒇 − 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆  𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕: [∑𝒙𝒊 ∆𝒑𝒊𝒑𝒊 − 𝚺𝒎𝒊( ∆𝒑𝒊𝒑𝒊 ]/𝑮𝑫𝑷55	  FAO	  also	  considers	  import	  dependence	  by	  calculating	  the	  following	  equation:	  	  
𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕  𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 = 𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔(𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔 + 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 − 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔) 56	  Similarly,	  IFPRI	  includes	  the	  following	  equation	  in	  their	  analysis:	  𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔(𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝑭𝒐𝒐𝒅  𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔)	  IFRI	  prefers	  this	  calculation	  over	  a	  simple	  measure	  of	  net	  food	  trade	  position,	  which	  would	  be	  calculated	  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 − 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠.	  	  The	  previous	  ratio	  captures	  the	  relative	  cost	  of	  food	  imports,	  by	  calculating	  it	  as	  a	  ratio	  of	  total	  export	  revenue.	  	  The	  ratio	  is	  calculated	  in	  this	  way	  so	  that	  increases	  demonstrate	  increases	  in	  food	  security,	  or	  reductions	  in	  vulnerability.57	  	  Using	  this	  assessment,	  the	  average	  export	  to	  food	  import	  world	  ratio	  is	  11.3,	  meaning	  that	  on	  average,	  countries	  spend	  about	  8.8%	  of	  their	  export	  revenue	  on	  food	  imports.58	  	  However,	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  an	  average	  of	  11.5%	  of	  export	  revenue	  is	  spent	  on	  food	  imports,	  with	  significant	  variation	  across	  countries.	  While	  this	  indicator	  reveals	  a	  country’s	  vulnerability	  due	  to	  the	  relative	  cost	  of	  its	  imports,	  it	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  relative	  stability	  of	  those	  import	  sources.	  	  Trade	  network	  analysis	  could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  “Terms-­‐of-­‐Trade	  Effect.”	  IFPRI	  Food	  Security	  Portal.	  Web.	  11	  Nov.	  2013.	  56	  “Food	  Security	  Indicators.”	  2013.	  FAO.	  http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-­‐fs/ess-­‐fadata/en/.	  57	  Breisinger,	  Clemens,	  Claudia	  Ringler,	  Catherine	  Aragon,	  and	  Olivier	  Ecker.	  2010.	  “Food	  Security	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  Current	  State	  and	  Future	  Perspectives.”	  58	  This	  is	  calculated	  as	  the	  inverse	  of	  the	  previous	  number	  multiplied	  by	  100.	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deepen	  these	  assessments	  by	  considering	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	  the	  networks	  through	  which	  countries	  acquire	  imports.59	  	  	  	  	  When	  analyzing	  supply	  chains	  in	  the	  context	  of	  food	  security,	  sources	  such	  as	  FAO	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  supply	  chain	  analysis	  of	  domestically	  produced	  commodities.60	  	  Booz	  and	  Company	  has	  assessed	  the	  robustness	  of	  a	  supply	  chain	  of	  imported	  commodities	  using	  5	  parameters:	  	  (1)	  supply	  base,	  (2)	  supplier	  concentrations,	  (3)	  source	  proximity,	  (4)	  source	  stability,	  and	  (5)	  trade	  corridors.61	  	  This	  supply	  chain	  analysis	  considers	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  trade	  partners	  on	  several	  levels	  of	  its	  analysis,	  and	  concludes	  that	  “a	  country	  that	  depends	  on	  nearby	  supply	  sources	  with	  shorter	  lead	  times	  is	  more	  resilient	  to	  supply	  shocks	  than	  countries	  whose	  suppliers	  have	  long	  lead	  times	  due	  to	  distance.”62	  	  Using	  trade	  network	  analysis,	  this	  project	  hopes	  to	  deepen	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  country’s	  food	  security	  risks.	  
Section	  2:	  Data	  and	  Methodology	  
I.	  Complex	  Network	  Analysis	  as	  a	  Method	  Complex	  network	  analysis	  will	  be	  used	  to	  analyze	  these	  trade	  networks.	  	  Complex	  network	  analysis	  (CNA)	  has	  been	  used	  to	  analyze	  social	  networks	  through	  Facebook	  or	  Twitter	  connections,	  intellectual	  networks	  through	  co-­‐authorship	  on	  publications,	  epidemiological	  networks	  through	  the	  spread	  of	  infectious	  disease,	  or	  industry	  production	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Definitions	  of	  network	  analysis	  methods	  and	  how	  strength	  of	  network	  is	  calculated	  are	  explained	  in	  the	  methodology	  section	  of	  this	  prospectus.	  60	  “FAO	  /	  WFP	  CROP	  AND	  FOOD	  SECURITY	  ASSESSMENT	  MISSION	  To	  the	  Syrian	  Arab	  Republic.”	  2013,	  p.22	  61	  Maroun,	  Nabih,	  George	  Atalla,	  Saida	  El	  Harakany,	  and	  Tarek	  Nasser.	  2009.	  “Food	  Security	  Key	  Issues	  for	  an	  Emerging	  MENA	  Priority.”	  62	  ibid,	  17.	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networks	  through	  global	  supply	  chains.	  	  CNA	  considers	  the	  network	  as	  a	  set	  of	  actors,	  or	  nodes,	  and	  their	  relationships	  between	  each	  other,	  as	  connected	  by	  edges.	  	  Relationships	  between	  nodes	  are	  continuous,	  through	  kinship,	  membership	  in	  the	  same	  association,	  co-­‐location	  in	  the	  same	  physical	  region	  or	  space	  or	  discrete,	  through	  an	  instance	  of	  communication	  or	  exchanges	  of	  information,	  goods	  or	  services.63	  	  	  Measures	  have	  been	  developed	  to	  determine	  how	  connected	  any	  two	  nodes	  are,	  or	  how	  central	  or	  important	  a	  node	  is	  to	  the	  entire	  network;	  some	  of	  these	  are	  described	  below.	  	  Several	  researchers64	  and	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  OECD	  support	  the	  use	  of	  network	  science	  analysis	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  trade	  networks,	  pointing	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  complex	  network	  analysis	  to	  assess	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  trade	  network,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  trade	  between	  countries65.	  	  Wu	  and	  Guclu	  used	  SNA	  (social	  network	  analysis)	  to	  consider	  the	  global	  maize	  trade	  with	  respect	  to	  food	  security.	  They	  selected	  social	  network	  analysis	  because	  of	  its	  superiority	  in	  	  
“visual	  representation	  of	  multiple	  actors	  in	  food	  trade	  patterns	  world	  wide:	  to	  
provide	  insights	  into	  the	  underlying	  structure	  of	  trade	  flows,	  to	  identify	  key	  
actors	  within	  the	  network	  whose	  behaviors	  may	  have	  especially	  strong	  
influences	  on	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  network,	  and	  to	  determine	  other	  descriptive	  
factors	  such	  as	  whether	  clustering	  of	  actors	  in	  trade	  occurs	  with	  implications	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Borgatti,	  Stephen	  P,	  and	  X	  U	  N	  Li.	  “ON	  SOCIAL	  NETWORK	  ANALYSIS	  IN	  A	  SUPPLY	  CHAIN	  CONTEXT.”	  Journal	  of	  Supply	  Chain	  Management	  April	  (2009),	  7.	  64	  Fagiolo,	  Giorgio,	  Javier	  Reyes,	  and	  Stefano	  Schiavo.	  “The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  Web:	  a	  Weighted-­‐Network	  Analysis.”	  Journal	  of	  Evolutionary	  Economics	  April	  (2010):	  n.	  pag.	  Web.	  22	  Nov.	  2013.	  65	  Reyes,	  Javier,	  Martina	  Garcia,	  and	  Ralph	  Lattimore.	  “The	  BRIICS	  and	  Changes	  in	  Global	  Trade	  Architecture.”	  
oecd.org	  1–27.	  Web.	  26	  Nov.	  2013.	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for	  the	  relative	  independence	  (or	  dependence)	  of	  these	  actors	  on	  the	  overall	  
flow	  of	  trade	  in	  the	  global	  system.”66	  
	  Analysis	  will	  include	  both	  changes	  in	  network-­‐level	  indicators	  that	  describe	  the	  network	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  node-­‐specific	  indicators,	  which	  describe	  individual	  countries	  within	  the	  network.	  	  A	  simple	  network-­‐level	  indicator	  is	  number	  of	  links,	  which	  notes	  the	  number	  of	  instances	  of	  trade	  in	  a	  year.	  	  As	  number	  of	  links	  increases,	  the	  network	  becomes	  denser.	  	  A	  more	  in-­‐depth	  consideration	  of	  this	  is	  network	  density,	  which	  describes	  the	  ratio	  of	  number	  of	  links	  to	  total	  possible	  links.	  	  Network	  density	  is	  on	  a	  0-­‐1	  scale,	  where	  a	  higher	  number	  implies	  a	  denser	  network.	  	  A	  density	  score	  of	  1	  means	  that	  all	  nodes	  are	  connected	  with	  all	  other	  nodes.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  international	  trade,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  all	  countries	  are	  trading	  with	  all	  other	  countries.	  	  Such	  a	  high	  score	  would	  be	  both	  impossible	  and	  inefficient.	  	  	  However,	  this	  indicator	  is	  useful	  for	  understanding	  the	  general	  trends	  of	  the	  network.	  	  Over	  time,	  a	  rising	  density	  score	  can	  indicate	  that	  the	  network	  on	  average	  is	  becoming	  more	  connected,	  and	  standardizes	  this	  increase	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  total	  number	  of	  possible	  connections.	  	  	  From	  density	  scores,	  we	  can	  understand	  if	  overall	  instances	  of	  trade	  are	  increasing	  or	  decreasing,	  but	  also	  the	  proportional	  size	  of	  that	  change.	  	  Node-­‐specific	  indicators	  describe	  changes	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  country,	  describing	  how	  an	  individual	  country	  is	  situated	  within	  the	  network.	  	  	  As	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  analyze	  individual	  nodes,	  several	  indicators	  were	  selected	  which	  would	  be	  most	  useful	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Wu,	  Felicia,	  and	  Hasan	  Guclu.	  2013.	  “Global	  Maize	  Trade	  and	  Food	  Security:	  Implications	  from	  a	  Social	  Network	  Model.”	  Risk	  Analysis :	  an	  Official	  Publication	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Risk	  Analysis	  (May	  8).	  doi:10.1111/risa.12064.	  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23656551.	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understanding	  a	  trade	  network.	  	  The	  first	  two,	  noted	  in	  Section	  3A,	  are	  clustering	  coefficients	  and	  betweenness	  centrality.	  	  A	  country’s	  clustering	  coefficient	  reflects	  the	  proportion	  of	  its	  trade	  that	  is	  occurring	  within	  its	  cluster.	  	  Again,	  this	  coefficient	  is	  on	  a	  0-­‐1	  scale,	  with	  a	  score	  of	  1	  reflecting	  100%	  trade	  within	  its	  cluster.	  	  Clustering	  coefficients	  could	  be	  useful	  in	  detecting	  a	  country’s	  dependence	  on	  a	  certain	  region.	  	  For	  example,	  perhaps	  Country	  A	  imports	  wheat	  from	  many	  other	  countries,	  and	  its	  large	  number	  of	  partners	  implies	  that	  it	  has	  a	  very	  diversified,	  secure	  network	  of	  partners.	  	  However,	  a	  high	  clustering	  coefficient	  would	  indicate	  that	  country	  A’s	  partners	  are	  all	  in	  the	  same	  cluster,	  and	  thus	  Country	  A	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  changes	  within	  that	  cluster.	  	  A	  natural	  disaster	  within	  that	  region	  could	  severely	  impact	  Country	  A’s	  ability	  to	  access	  wheat.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Country	  B	  may	  have	  the	  same	  number	  of	  partners,	  but	  these	  partners	  are	  in	  different	  clusters.	  	  Country	  B	  scores	  the	  same	  as	  Country	  A	  in	  node	  degree	  (number	  of	  partners),	  but	  has	  a	  lower	  clustering	  coefficient.	  	  If	  there	  is	  a	  shock	  to	  the	  market	  such	  as	  a	  reduction	  in	  supply	  due	  to	  poor	  harvests	  in	  one	  cluster,	  Country	  B	  can	  increase	  its	  trade	  in	  the	  other	  cluster(s)	  to	  which	  it	  belongs.	  	  In	  this	  way	  it	  is	  more	  secure.67	  	  	  	  Clustering	  coefficients	  and	  node	  degree	  consider	  a	  country’s	  direct	  partnerships,	  but	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  overall	  network.	  Centrality	  measures	  take	  this	  into	  account.	  	  Several	  centrality	  measures	  appear	  in	  this	  analysis:	  betweenness,	  eigenvector	  and	  authority	  centrality.	  	  	  For	  all	  of	  these	  indicators,	  a	  higher	  score	  implies	  more	  a	  more	  central	  node.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  clustering	  coefficients	  rely	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  network	  has	  clearly	  defined	  clusters,	  presumably	  defined	  by	  geographical	  proximity	  or	  trade	  agreements.	  These	  clusters	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  analysis.	  	  In	  such	  a	  disconnected	  network,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  clusters	  are	  not	  clearly	  defined	  and	  thus	  clustering	  coefficients	  are	  not	  as	  useful	  as	  indicators.	  Here,	  average	  clustering	  coefficients	  are	  noted,	  but	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  clusters	  are	  not	  explored.	  	  More	  analysis	  could	  be	  done	  on	  the	  specific	  clusters	  detected	  in	  this	  wheat	  network.	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Betweenness	  centrality	  of	  Country	  A	  indicates	  the	  proportion	  of	  countries	  in	  the	  network	  is	  Country	  A	  on	  the	  shortest	  path	  between.	  	  Since	  wheat	  is	  not	  traveling	  from	  one	  end	  of	  the	  network	  to	  the	  other,	  this	  indicator	  is	  not	  useful	  in	  a	  practical	  sense,	  however	  it	  can	  still	  be	  used	  in	  theory	  to	  understand	  how	  “important”	  a	  certain	  country	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  overall	  network.	  	  	  	  Eigenvector	  centrality	  calculates	  a	  score	  for	  a	  country	  based	  on	  the	  centrality	  score	  of	  its	  partners.	  	  If	  a	  country	  is	  connected	  to	  another	  “important”	  player	  in	  the	  network,	  it	  will	  have	  a	  higher	  eigenvector	  centrality	  score.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  international	  trade,	  eigenvector	  centrality	  describes	  connections	  to	  highly	  connected	  trading	  partners.	  	  Being	  connected	  to	  major	  players	  in	  the	  wheat	  market	  would	  imply	  more	  security	  because	  it	  is	  presumed	  that	  the	  major	  players	  are	  the	  most	  secure	  partners.68	  	  	  Both	  betweenness	  centrality	  and	  eigenvector	  centrality	  define	  both	  exports	  and	  imports	  as	  a	  connection.	  Therefore,	  major	  exporters	  and	  major	  importers	  may	  have	  similar	  betweenness	  or	  eigenvector	  centrality	  scores.	  	  Authority	  centrality,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  considers	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  connection.	  	  Authority	  centrality	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  country’s	  in-­‐directed	  connections	  (imports),	  not	  out-­‐directed	  connections	  (exports).	  	  The	  name	  of	  the	  indicator	  comes	  from	  social	  network	  analysis,	  which	  typically	  analyzes	  information-­‐sharing	  or	  communication—a	  node	  is	  considered	  an	  “authority”	  if	  it	  is	  receiving	  information	  from	  nodes	  that	  are	  giving	  out	  a	  lot	  of	  information,	  or	  “hubs.”	  	  In	  trade	  analysis,	  a	  node	  is	  considered	  an	  “authority”	  if	  it	  is	  receiving	  imports	  from	  the	  major	  exporters,	  or	  “hubs.”	  	  This	  indicator	  is	  useful	  for	  understanding	  the	  centrality	  of	  net-­‐importers	  in	  particular.	  	  If	  a	  high	  level	  of	  partnership	  with	  major	  exporters	  is	  considered	  an	  indicator	  of	  strength	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  However,	  caution	  should	  be	  exercised	  with	  this	  indicator,	  given	  the	  number	  of	  trade	  bans	  that	  have	  been	  raised	  by	  major	  players	  in	  the	  past	  decade.	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wheat	  market,	  authority	  centrality	  is	  the	  best	  assessment	  of	  each	  MENA	  countries’	  position	  within	  the	  network.69	  	  	  	  	  	  
II.	  Data	  Data	  on	  food	  trade	  flows	  were	  gathered	  from	  UN	  Commodity	  Trade	  Statistics	  Database.	  	  Country-­‐level	  data	  on	  exports	  and	  imports	  of	  wheat	  were	  gathered	  and	  analyzed.	  	  Only	  the	  summary	  data	  in	  Section	  3C	  come	  from	  reported	  imports.	  	  	  All	  other	  analysis	  was	  performed	  using	  reported	  exports	  as	  opposed	  to	  imports,	  because	  this	  data	  was	  more	  complete	  and	  considered	  more	  reliable.	  	  Data	  on	  reported	  exports	  to	  MENA	  countries	  was	  complete,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Djibouti.	  	  However,	  data	  on	  reported	  exports	  was	  not	  complete	  for	  Syria,	  Iraq,	  Iran,	  and	  Libya,	  Sudan	  and	  Kuwait.	  	  	  Data	  on	  consumption,	  production,	  and	  ending	  stocks	  comes	  from	  FAO-­‐Stat	  database.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Again,	  the	  same	  caution	  should	  be	  exercised—if	  major	  exporters	  are	  considered	  unstable	  because	  of	  their	  propensity	  to	  raise	  trade	  bans,	  this	  indicator	  is	  less	  useful.	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Section	  3:	  Findings	  
A.	  Overview	  of	  the	  Global	  Wheat	  Network,	  1990-­‐2012	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Figure	  1A:	  Network	  Indicators	  of	  
Global	  Wheat	  Market,	  by	  Quantity	  


























































Figure	  1B:	  Network	  Indicators	  of	  
Global	  Wheat	  Market,	  by	  Value	  
(USD)	  
Density	  of	  Network	   Average	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  Centrality	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   As	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  figures	  above,	  the	  global	  wheat	  trade	  network	  is	  following	  a	  trend	  of	  increasing	  links,	  decreasing	  centrality,	  and	  slightly	  decreasing	  clustering,	  while	  density	  has	  remained	  fairly	  stable.	  This	  implies	  that	  instances	  of	  trade	  have	  increased,	  and	  clusters,	  or	  groups	  of	  countries	  that	  trade	  primarily	  with	  each	  other,	  have	  decreased.	  	  Also,	  average	  decreasing	  betweenness	  centrality	  scores	  imply	  that	  relatively	  important	  countries	  in	  the	  network	  (in	  terms	  of	  either	  importers	  or	  exporters)	  have	  become	  less	  important	  overall.	  	  These	  numbers	  make	  sense	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  increasingly	  globalized	  network	  with	  both	  importers	  and	  exporters	  are	  diversifying	  their	  networks.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  importers	  are	  being	  forced	  to	  diversify	  their	  networks	  in	  the	  face	  of	  export	  bans	  from	  the	  major	  exporters,	  and	  this	  diversification	  reflects	  itself	  in	  decreased	  clustering	  and	  betweenness	  scores.	  	  Another	  possible	  explanation	  for	  these	  trends	  is	  the	  recent	  rise	  of	  the	  Black	  Sea	  countries	  (Kazakhstan,	  Ukraine	  and	  Russia)	  as	  major	  exporters.	  	  Increasing	  wheat	  purchases	  from	  this	  region	  could	  disrupt	  existing	  clusters,	  and	  dilute	  centrality	  scores	  of	  other	  major	  exporters	  such	  as	  Canada	  and	  Australia.	  	   This	  analysis	  was	  performed	  with	  2	  sets	  of	  edge	  weights	  (or	  weighted	  connections	  between	  countries)—one	  by	  instances	  of	  trade	  in	  metric	  tons	  and	  one	  by	  value	  traded	  in	  USD.	  	  This	  was	  performed	  in	  order	  to	  see	  if	  there	  was	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  network	  between	  these	  two	  ways	  of	  analyzing	  the	  data.	  	  Its	  possible	  that	  a	  country	  with	  more	  or	  less	  purchasing	  power	  will	  appear	  as	  more	  or	  less	  central	  in	  the	  analysis	  by	  value	  than	  in	  that	  same	  analysis	  by	  metric	  ton,	  thus	  causing	  more	  fluctuation	  in	  the	  data.	  	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  of	  the	  indicators	  analyzed,	  the	  betweenness	  centrality	  indicator	  is	  indeed	  sensitive	  to	  analysis	  by	  value	  instead	  of	  weight.	  	  When	  using	  value	  traded	  in	  USD	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traded	  as	  the	  links	  between	  countries,	  betweenness	  centrality	  scores	  fluctuate	  much	  more	  than	  when	  looking	  at	  quantity	  traded.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  score	  rises	  in	  2007	  when	  analyzing	  value	  instead	  of	  quantity.	  This	  implies	  that	  some	  countries	  are	  importing	  (or	  exporting)	  wheat	  at	  a	  higher	  value	  than	  others,	  and	  establishing	  themselves	  as	  important	  nodes	  in	  the	  network	  through	  either	  their	  ability	  to	  sell	  wheat	  at	  a	  higher	  price	  or	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  wheat	  at	  a	  higher	  price.	  	  	  	  	  
B.	  Node-­‐Specific	  Indicators	  	  	   While	  the	  average	  change	  of	  the	  network	  overall	  provides	  useful	  information	  about	  the	  entire	  network	  as	  a	  whole,	  this	  section	  considers	  the	  top	  players	  on	  node-­‐specific	  indicators.	  	  	  Since	  the	  network	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  variation	  in	  both	  size	  of	  trade	  and	  number	  of	  partners,	  average	  indicators	  do	  not	  accurately	  depict	  fluctuations	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  countries.	  	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  major	  players	  in	  the	  network	  are	  changing—both	  in	  the	  network	  overall,	  and	  for	  MENA	  countries	  specifically.	  	  	  Section	  I	  describe	  these	  changes	  in	  terms	  of	  importers	  and	  exporters,	  through	  eigenvector	  centrality	  measures,	  while	  Section	  II	  uses	  authority	  centrality	  to	  focus	  on	  net-­‐importers.	  	  
I.	  Eigenvector	  Centrality	  	   Eigenvector	  Centrality	  gives	  country	  x	  a	  score	  based	  on	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  countries	  with	  which	  x	  trades.	  	  A	  country	  has	  a	  higher	  eigenvector	  centrality	  score	  if	  it	  is	  connected	  with	  other	  well-­‐connected	  countries.	  The	  score	  is	  calculated	  without	  regard	  to	  whether	  the	  connection	  is	  an	  import	  or	  an	  export,	  so	  this	  measure	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  the	  importance	  of	  both	  exporters	  and	  importers	  together.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  top	  ten	  countries	  in	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Overall Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value
1 USA 0.877 1 USA 0.837 1 USA 0.861 1 USA 0.89
2 Japan 0.457 2 Canada 0.557 2 Canada 0.473 2 Canada 0.55
3 Canada 0.434 3 Japan 0.458 3 Egypt 0.431 3 Japan 0.517
4 Mexico 0.407 4 Mexico 0.369 4 Japan 0.392 4 Mexico 0.331
5 Nigeria 0.4 5 Nigeria 0.321 5 Mexico 0.315 5 Nigeria 0.252
6 France 0.264 6 Egypt 0.265 6 Nigeria 0.273 6 Iraq 0.225
7 Italy 0.238 7 France 0.259 7 Russian Federation 0.266 7 Algeria 0.225
8 Philippines 0.221 8 Iraq 0.231 8 Iraq 0.213 8 Iran 0.223
9 Egypt 0.207 9 Italy 0.22 9 Italy 0.202 9 Egypt 0.21
10 Rep. of Korea 0.206 10 Philippines 0.215 10 France 0.199 10 Philippines 0.201
MENA
Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value
9 Egypt 0.207 6 Egypt 0.265 3 Egypt 0.431 6 Iraq 0.225
11 Algeria 0.176 9 Iraq 0.231 8 Iraq 0.213 7 Algeria 0.225
13 Iraq 0.159 11 Algeria 0.17 11 Algeria 0.182 8 Iran 0.223
24 Morocco 0.076 22 Morocco 0.083 13 Morocco 0.179 9 Egypt 0.21
26 Yemen 0.07 25 Yemen 0.076 18 Yemen 0.123 18 Morocco 0.087
33 Israel 0.047 36 Iran 0.038 29 Tunisia 0.065 33 Yemen 0.047
34 Fmr Sudan 0.046 40 Tunisia 0.031 38 United Arab Emirates 0.04 35 Israel 0.039
50 Djibouti 0.016 44 Syria 0.028 39 Fmr Sudan 0.038 41 Fmr Sudan 0.03
59 Tunisia 0.014 46 Israel 0.026 42 Israel 0.035 42 Tunisia 0.03
62 Syria 0.012 53 Fmr Sudan 0.022 49 Libya 0.025 55 United Arab Emirates 0.015
Mean Value 0.037 0.038 0.04 0.034
(st dev) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Overall Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value
1 USA 0.765 1 USA 0.776 1 USA 0.819 1 USA 0.766
2 Canada 0.634 2 Canada 0.498 2 Japan 0.47 2 Canada 0.497
3 Japan 0.43 3 Japan 0.405 3 Canada 0.42 3 Australia 0.443
4 Nigeria 0.321 4 Egypt 0.392 4 Egypt 0.335 4 Japan 0.44
5 Mexico 0.293 5 France 0.353 5 Australia 0.334 5 Mexico 0.357
6 France 0.267 6 Nigeria 0.328 6 Mexico 0.321 6 Indonesia 0.326
7 Australia 0.256 7 Mexico 0.279 7 Nigeria 0.316 7 Rep. of Korea 0.287
8 Italy 0.252 8 Australia 0.257 8 France 0.255 8 Nigeria 0.281
9 Algeria 0.216 9 Italy 0.226 9 Rep. of Korea 0.245 9 Philippines 0.237
10 Indonesia 0.199 10
Rep. of 
Korea 0.217 10 Indonesia 0.23 10 Egypt 0.223
MENA
9 Algeria 0.216 4 Egypt 0.392 4 Egypt 0.335 14 Algeria 0.144
12 Egypt 0.172 12 Algeria 0.197 12 Algeria 0.2 18 Iran 0.106
13 Iraq 0.156 15 Morocco 0.154 13 Iraq 0.187 20 Iraq 0.104
18 Iran 0.126 21 Yemen 0.098 18 Morocco 0.1 21 Yemen 0.092
19 Saudi Arabia 0.118 22 Iraq 0.097 22 Yemen 0.084 25 Morocco 0.07
21 Morocco 0.117 32 Saudi Arabia 0.059 25 Saudi Arabia 0.075 26 Saudi Arabia 0.067
22 Yemen 0.103 38 Fmr Sudan 0.05 36 Jordan 0.049 28 Sudan 0.062
35
United Arab 
Emirates 0.053 39 Tunisia 0.046 38 Israel 0.047 43 United Arab Emirates 0.038
37 Fmr Sudan 0.051 44 Libya 0.041 45 Tunisia 0.028 44 Israel 0.036
44 Tunisia 0.038 47 Israel 0.035 47 United Arab Emirates 0.024 48 Tunisia 0.027
Mean Value 0.04 0.041 0.039 0.039
(st dev) (0.094) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Eigenvector centrality
Calculates the principal eigenvector of the network. A node is central to the extent that its neighbors are central. Leaders of strong cliques are 
individuals who or organizations who are collected to others that are themselves highly connected to each other. In other words, if you have a clique 
then the individual most connected to others in the clique and other cliques, is the leader of the clique. Individuals or organizations who are connected 
to many otherwise isolated individuals or organizations will have a much lower score in this measure then those that are connected to groups that have 
many connections themselves. The scientific name of this measure is eigenvector centrality and it is calculated on agent by agent matrices.
2005 2006 2007 2008
Input network(s): Country x Country Value ($)
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III.	  Authority	  Centrality	  	   Authority	  Centrality	  is	  similar	  to	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  however	  it	  is	  calculated	  by	  considering	  only	  the	  out-­‐degree	  (or	  number	  of	  exporting	  partners)	  of	  an	  importing	  country’s	  partners.	  	  Over	  time,	  importing	  Country	  A’s	  authority	  centrality	  would	  increase	  as	  its	  trading	  partners	  increase	  export	  quantities	  or	  partnerships.	  	  In	  this	  measure,	  MENA	  countries,	  as	  net-­‐importers,	  make	  more	  appearances	  in	  the	  top	  ten.	  Egypt,	  Algeria,	  and	  Iraq	  are	  among	  the	  highest-­‐scoring	  countries	  in	  the	  network	  overall	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  indicator.	  	  During	  2008	  and	  2009,	  Iran	  appears	  as	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  country	  in	  this	  measure,	  when	  its	  production	  rates	  decreased	  and	  it	  increased	  its	  exports	  significantly.	  	  Iran	  accomplished	  these	  increases	  despite	  several	  trade	  bans	  from	  its	  partners,	  perhaps	  exhibiting	  its	  political	  power	  in	  the	  region.	  	  In	  2009,	  during	  Algeria’s	  boom	  in	  domestic	  production	  and	  subsequent	  wheat	  import	  ban,	  it	  disappears	  from	  the	  top	  ten	  in	  this	  measure.	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B.	  Export	  bans	  and	  effects	  on	  MENA	  partners	  	   After	  addressing	  the	  overall	  changes	  of	  the	  wheat	  network	  on	  a	  global	  and	  country-­‐specific	  level,	  this	  section	  analyzes	  the	  impact	  of	  four	  trade	  bans	  on	  MENA	  partners	  specifically.	  	  This	  section	  describes	  the	  motivations	  for	  implementing	  the	  ban,	  the	  length	  of	  
Authority centrality
Input network(s): Country x Country Weight kg
TOP TEN COUNTRIES
Overall Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value
1 Japan 0.549 1 Japan 0.527 1 Egypt 0.555 1 Japan 0.579
2 Nigeria 0.531 2 Egypt 0.483 2 Japan 0.555 2 Iran 0.429
3 Mexico 0.524 3 Mexico 0.454 3 Mexico 0.459 3 Mexico 0.406
4 Egypt 0.408 4 Nigeria 0.423 4 Nigeria 0.443 4 USA 0.395
5 Italy 0.379 5 Italy 0.391 5 Iraq 0.326 5 Egypt 0.377
6 Philippines 0.327 6 Algeria 0.336 6 Philippines 0.296 6 Algeria 0.358
7 Rep. of Korea 0.307 7 Iraq 0.333 7 Indonesia 0.284 7 Indonesia 0.331
8 Algeria 0.291 8 Philippines 0.306 8 Morocco 0.283 8 Nigeria 0.329
9 Iraq 0.25 9 Rep. of Korea 0.262 9 Italy 0.271 9 Iraq 0.309
10 Spain 0.246 10 Netherlands 0.254 10 Algeria 0.261 10 Philippines 0.266
MENA
Ranking
4 Egypt 0.408 2 Egypt 0.483 1 Egypt 0.555 2 Iran 0.429
8 Algeria 0.291 6 Algeria 0.336 5 Iraq 0.326 5 Egypt 0.377
9 Iraq 0.25 7 Iraq 0.333 8 Morocco 0.283 6 Algeria 0.358
16 Morocco 0.159 17 Morocco 0.163 10 Algeria 0.261 9 Iraq 0.309
17 Yemen 0.149 18 Yemen 0.161 12 Yemen 0.226 15 Morocco 0.191
21 Israel 0.1 28 Tunisia 0.072 28 Tunisia 0.084 26 Fmr Sudan 0.092
42 Tunisia 0.038 32 Iran 0.059 32 Israel 0.067 29 Israel 0.076
47 Djibouti 0.035 34 Israel 0.059 34 United Arab Emirates0.059 30 Yemen 0.074
62 Lebanon 0.018 48 Fmr Sudan 0.035 37 Fmr Sudan 0.05 38 Tunisia 0.056
63 United Arab Emirates0.018 50 United Arab Emirates0.035 40 Libya 0.044 42 United Arab Emirates0.041
Mean Value (st dev) 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.042
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.094)
TOP TEN COUNTRIES
Overall Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value Ranking Country Value
1 Special Categories 0.476 1 Egypt 0.515 1 Japan 0.569 1 Japan 0.55
2 Indonesia 0.447 2 Japan 0.489 2 Egypt 0.502 2 Indonesia 0.513
3 Egypt 0.436 3 Nigeria 0.429 3 Nigeria 0.46 3 Rep. of Korea 0.492
4 Japan 0.415 4 Algeria 0.392 4 Mexico 0.45 4 Mexico 0.428
5 Iran 0.354 5 Italy 0.373 5 Rep. of Korea 0.382 5 Philippines 0.406
6 Italy 0.314 6 Mexico 0.372 6 Philippines 0.38 6 Nigeria 0.362
7 Rep. of Korea 0.31 7 Rep. of Korea 0.332 7 Indonesia 0.363 7 China 0.347
8 Nigeria 0.273 8 Morocco 0.307 8 Iraq 0.304 8 Egypt 0.315
9 Bangladesh 0.258 9 Indonesia 0.291 9 Italy 0.232 9 Viet Nam 0.245
10 Yemen 0.253 10 Philippines 0.275 10 Turkey 0.208 10 Thailand 0.234
MENA
Ranking
3 Egypt 0.436 1 Egypt 0.515 2 Egypt 0.502 8 Egypt 0.315
5 Iran 0.354 4 Algeria 0.392 8 Iraq 0.304 11 Iran 0.205
10 Yemen 0.253 8 Morocco 0.307 12 Yemen 0.18 12 Yemen 0.2
11 Iraq 0.251 12 Yemen 0.215 14 Algeria 0.172 13 Iraq 0.173
13 Algeria 0.241 18 Iraq 0.157 15 Morocco 0.143 15 Algeria 0.164
18 Fmr Sudan 0.168 28 Libya 0.091 21 Saudi Arabia 0.119 19 Sudan 0.129
21 Morocco 0.144 29 Fmr Sudan 0.089 23 Israel 0.101 22 Saudi Arabia 0.111
24 Syria 0.143 32 Saudi Arabia 0.082 25 Jordan 0.091 24 Morocco 0.095
27 Saudi Arabia 0.112 37 Israel 0.072 30 Fmr Sudan 0.075 27 Israel 0.073
28 Israel 0.11 38 Tunisia 0.071 38 United Arab Emirates0.044 31 United Arab Emirates0.064
0.047 0.046 0.042 0.041
(0.091) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094)
A node is authority-central to the extent that its in-links are from nodes that have many out-links. Individuals or organizations that act as 
authorities are receiving information from a wide range of others each of whom sends information to a large number of others. Technically, 
an agent is authority-central if its in-links are from agents that have are sending links to many others. The scientific name of this measure is 
authority centrality and it is calculated on agent by agent matrices.
2010 2011 20122009
2005 2006 2007 2008
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the	  ban	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  exports	  reduced.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  export	  bans	  vary	  in	  both	  length	  and	  size	  of	  reduction—some	  export	  bans	  last	  only	  for	  one	  year,	  while	  some	  last	  for	  several.	  	  Depending	  on	  several	  factors	  including	  the	  time	  of	  the	  year,	  the	  structure	  of	  contracts	  and	  futures	  purchasing,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  panic	  purchasing,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  ban	  is	  observed	  in	  the	  year	  it	  is	  declared,	  or	  up	  to	  a	  year	  afterwards.	  	  This	  section	  also	  describes	  individual	  MENA	  countries	  of	  interest,	  and	  their	  reaction	  to	  the	  bans.	  	  Countries	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  previous	  levels	  of	  wheat	  available	  by	  increasing	  imports	  from	  existing	  partners,	  by	  creating	  new	  partnerships,	  or	  by	  increasing	  domestic	  production.	  	  	  	  	   A	  summary	  table	  follows	  each	  description,	  summarizing	  average	  effects	  of	  each	  ban	  in	  the	  MENA	  countries,	  reporting	  changes	  in	  import	  quantity,	  wheat	  availability,	  number	  of	  partners	  and	  betweenness	  centrality.70	  	  Each	  table	  includes	  a	  note	  of	  what	  year	  was	  considered	  the	  “pre”	  and	  what	  was	  considered	  “post”	  ban,	  since	  each	  ban	  differs	  in	  when	  its	  impact	  was	  felt.	  	  	  	  
2007:	  Ukraine	  Kazakhstan,	  Russia	  and	  the	  Ukraine,	  sometimes	  known	  as	  the	  Black	  Sea	  grain	  exporters,	  accounted	  for	  15	  percent	  of	  global	  wheat	  production.	  	  Their	  share	  in	  global	  wheat	  trade	  was	  expected	  to	  reach	  26%	  in	  2008-­‐2009.71	  	  Because	  of	  their	  proximity	  to	  MENA	  countries,	  they	  provide	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  total	  exports	  to	  the	  region.	  	  In	  2005,	  for	  example,	  exports	  from	  these	  three	  countries	  represented	  33.6%	  of	  the	  total	  exports	  to	  the	  MENA	  region.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Import	  quantity	  here	  is	  calculated	  by	  summing	  total	  exports	  to	  a	  country	  as	  reported	  in	  the	  UNCOMTRADE	  database.	  	  Again,	  this	  is	  considered	  more	  reliable	  than	  reported	  imports.	  	  A	  country’s	  total	  availability	  is	  defined	  as:	  Production+Stocks+Imports-­‐Exports.	  	  This	  data	  comes	  from	  FAO	  Stat	  Database.	  71	  Prikhodko,	  Dmitry.	  “Grain	  Markets	  in	  Kazakhstan	  ,	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  and	  Ukraine.”	  World	  Grain	  Forum	  (2009):	  n.	  pag.	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   In	  2005,	  Ukraine	  served	  as	  a	  major	  exporter	  of	  wheat	  to	  the	  MENA	  region,	  with	  significant	  instances	  of	  exports	  (over	  100,000	  MTs)	  to	  Tunisia,	  Algeria,	  Morocco,	  Libya,	  Egypt	  and	  Jordan.	  	  Ukraine	  produces	  several	  types	  of	  wheat,	  with	  differing	  planting	  and	  harvesting	  seasons.	  	  Thus,	  both	  summer	  and	  winter	  weather	  patterns	  affect	  Ukraine’s	  production	  of	  wheat.	  	  From	  August	  to	  November	  2005,	  Ukraine	  experienced	  a	  drought	  that	  the	  USDA	  estimated	  would	  reduce	  total	  production	  in	  2006	  by	  8	  million	  tons.	  	  The	  drought	  caused	  26%	  of	  the	  country’s	  wheat	  to	  be	  in	  poor	  condition	  (as	  opposed	  to	  9%	  in	  the	  prior	  year).	  72	  	   Responding	  to	  the	  reduced	  output,	  in	  October	  2006	  Ukraine	  instituted	  a	  quota	  system	  for	  grain	  exporters,	  with	  the	  justification	  that	  the	  system	  would	  protect	  domestic	  prices	  and	  availability.	  	  However,	  the	  quota	  system	  was	  poorly	  targeted	  because	  it	  didn’t	  benefit	  consumers	  and	  instead	  hurt	  both	  grain	  producers	  and	  traders.73	  In	  the	  MENA	  region,	  Ukraine	  reduced	  trade	  with	  most	  of	  its	  previous	  MENA	  partners,	  but	  increased	  trade	  with	  both	  Egypt	  and	  Yemen.	  	  	  	   Continued	  drought	  and	  high	  spring	  temperatures	  further	  reduced	  wheat	  harvests	  by	  roughly	  1	  million	  MT’s	  2007.74	  In	  this	  year,	  Ukraine	  instituted	  resolutions	  794	  and	  844,	  which	  reduced	  quotas	  to	  3,000	  MT	  from	  March	  1,	  2007	  until	  State	  Reserves	  were	  returned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Lindeman,	  Mark.	  “Ukraine:	  Wheat	  Yield	  Forecast	  to	  Drop	  Due	  to	  Severe	  Fall	  Drought.”	  USDA	  Foreign	  
Agricultural	  Service:	  Commodity	  Intelligence	  Report	  (2006):	  n.	  pag.	  73	  Cramon,	  Stephan	  v.,	  and	  Martin	  Raiser.	  “The	  Quotas	  on	  Grain	  Exports	  in	  Ukraine :	  Ineffective	  ,	  Inefficient	  and	  Non-­‐Transparent.”	  Institute	  for	  Economic	  Research	  and	  Policy	  Consulting	  in	  Ukraine	  (2006):	  1–12.	  74	  “Ukraine	  Drought	  Threatens	  Grain	  Crop,	  Quotas	  Loom.”	  bdnews24.com	  2007.	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to	  adequate	  levels.75	  	  A	  quota	  this	  low	  is	  essentially	  a	  grain	  export	  ban.	  	  Again	  this	  ban	  adversely	  affected	  wheat	  traders	  and	  does	  not	  improve	  prices	  for	  consumers.	  	  The	  ban	  was	  regarded	  as	  illogical	  because	  it	  reduced	  trade	  further	  than	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  domestic	  stocks.76	  	  	   During	  2007,	  Ukraine	  reduced	  overall	  exports	  by	  77.4	  percent,	  eliminating	  exports	  entirely	  with	  twenty	  of	  its	  previous	  partners.	  	  Exports	  were	  reduced	  to	  all	  MENA	  partners;	  however,	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia	  still	  received	  over	  100,000	  MT	  of	  Ukrainian	  wheat.	  	  Several	  of	  Ukraine’s	  largest	  trading	  partners	  in	  the	  region	  (Egypt,	  Tunisia,	  Israel	  and	  Yemen)	  reacted	  by	  increasing	  imports	  from	  their	  existing	  partners,	  Russia	  and	  Kazakhstan.	  	  	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  visualizations	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  	  When	  viewing	  the	  network	  sized	  by	  out-­‐degree	  (or	  number	  of	  partners	  for	  exporting	  countries),	  Ukraine	  becomes	  much	  smaller	  between	  2006	  and	  2007.	  	  But	  Russia	  and	  Kazakhstan	  grow	  in	  size	  during	  this	  time.	  	  Other	  MENA	  partners	  such	  as	  Algeria	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  established	  new	  trading	  relationships	  with	  Russia	  and	  Kazakhstan.	  	  	  Overall,	  grain	  exports	  from	  Russia	  and	  Kazakhstan	  increased	  by	  46.9	  and	  53.4	  percent,	  respectively.77	  	   	  In	  late	  2007,	  the	  government	  instituted	  a	  licensing	  system,	  allowed	  a	  quota	  of	  200,000	  MT	  of	  wheat	  exports.	  	  In	  April	  2008,	  Ukraine	  expanded	  the	  export	  quotas	  to	  1.2	  million	  MT.	  	  During	  this	  year,	  Ukrainian	  wheat	  exports	  increased	  to	  all	  MENA	  partners.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Weather	  and	  Policy	  Risks	  -­‐	  Are	  the	  Grain	  Export	  Restrictions	  Unavoidable	  to	  Achieve	  Food	  Security	  in	  Ukraine ?”	  INSTITUTE	  FOR	  ECONOMIC	  RESEARCH	  AND	  POLICY	  CONSULTING :	  German-­‐Ukrainian	  Agricultural	  
Policy	  Dialogue	  Policy	  Pap	  (2007):	  n.	  pag.	  76	  ibid.	  77	  Dollive,	  Kendall.	  “The	  Impact	  of	  Export	  Restraints	  on	  Rising	  Grain	  Prices	  The	  Impact	  of	  Export	  Restraints	  on	  Rising	  Grain	  Prices.”	  US	  International	  Trade	  Commission	  Office	  of	  Economics	  Working	  Paper	  2008-­‐09-­‐A	  (2008):	  25.	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This	  is	  visible	  in	  Appendix	  1,	  Out	  Degree	  visualizations,	  where	  Ukraine	  re-­‐emerges	  as	  a	  major	  player	  in	  2008.	  However,	  reductions	  in	  trade	  from	  other	  important	  partners	  in	  2008	  inhibited	  the	  rise	  of	  overall	  wheat	  supply	  for	  most	  of	  Ukraine’s	  trading	  partners	  in	  the	  region.	  	  







Min	   Max	   %	  of	  countries	  reducing	  





-­‐109453	   -­‐304164	   -­‐11	   100.00%	   0.00%	  
	   (115542)	   	   	   	   	  Change	  in	  
Wheat	  
Availability	  (MT)	  
-­‐402034	   -­‐4451488	   787407	   61.54%	   38.46%	  
	   (1309042)	   	   	   	   	  
Number	  of	  
Partners	   -­‐3	   -­‐9	   4	   84.62%	   0.00%	  
	   (3.85)	   	   	   	   	  Betweenness	  
Centrality	   134	   -­‐195	   691	   30.77%	   53.85%	  
	   (288)	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  *Average	  change	  for	  all	  MENA	  trading	  partners	  with	  Ukraine	  between	  2007	  and	  2006	  
	   	  	  
2008:	  Kazakhstan	  In	  2007,	  Kazakhstan’s	  major	  trading	  partners	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  included	  four	  countries:	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  Yemen	  and	  Iran.	  As	  noted	  above,	  both	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia	  had	  increased	  imports	  from	  Kazakhstan	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  Ukrainian	  trade	  ban.	  	  	  	   In	  2008,	  the	  Kazakhstani	  government	  fist	  levied	  export	  taxes	  on	  wheat	  in	  March,	  then	  banned	  wheat	  exports	  entirely	  from	  April	  15	  to	  September	  1,	  or	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	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new	  harvesting	  season.	  	  This	  short-­‐term	  ban	  was	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  domestic	  supply	  as	  the	  country	  was	  nearing	  capacity	  for	  exports.78	  	  However,	  it	  allowed	  the	  exportation	  of	  milled	  flour,	  in	  order	  to	  raise	  the	  domestic	  mill	  production.79	  	  This	  short-­‐term	  trade	  ban	  did	  not	  affect	  global	  wheat	  prices,	  but	  it	  did	  harm	  neighboring	  countries	  that	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capital	  to	  purchase	  wheat	  at	  higher	  prices	  and	  with	  a	  larger	  transportation	  cost.	  	  During	  this	  time,	  Kazakhstan	  reduced	  trade	  with	  75%	  of	  its	  MENA	  trading	  partners;	  however	  it	  increased	  trade	  with	  Iran	  and	  nearly	  doubled	  its	  exports	  to	  Egypt,	  which	  gained	  10	  other	  new	  trading	  partners.	  	  A	  majority	  of	  Kazakhstan’s	  trading	  partners	  were	  able	  to	  withstand	  the	  ban	  by	  adding	  new	  partners.	  	  Again	  this	  is	  visible	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  	  When	  nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  out-­‐degree,	  Kazakhstan	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  shrink	  in	  influence	  in	  2008	  and	  2009,	  with	  Russia	  and	  Ukraine	  growing	  to	  compensate	  for	  this	  reduced	  trade.	  	  In	  2008,	  many	  more	  MENA	  countries	  are	  visible	  in	  the	  visualizations	  by	  centrality	  as	  compared	  to	  this	  same	  visualization	  in	  2007.	  	  One	  potential	  reason	  for	  this	  change	  is	  that	  many	  MENA	  countries	  formed	  new	  partnerships	  in	  response	  to	  Kazakhstan’s	  ban.	  	  	  	  	  	   In	  2009,	  while	  the	  ban	  was	  lifted,	  Kazakhstan	  did	  not	  resume	  trade	  with	  any	  MENA	  countries.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  reported	  exports	  only	  to	  Iran,	  with	  which	  it	  nearly	  tripled	  its	  trade.	  	  In	  2010	  the	  country	  resumed	  exports	  to	  several	  of	  its	  prior	  partners	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Lillis,	  Joanna.	  “Kazakhstan:	  Grain	  Export	  Ban	  Stokes	  Inflation	  Fears	  Elsewhere	  in	  Central	  Asia.”	  Eurasianet.org	  2008.	  79	  “Kazakhstan’s	  Government	  Decides	  to	  Ban	  Wheat	  Exports.”	  Reliefweb.int	  (2008):	  n.	  pag.	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Impact	  of	  Kazakhstan's	  Trade	  Ban	  in	  the	  MENA	  Region*	  
Outcome	  
Variable	  
Average	  Change	  	  
(Standard	  
Deviation)	   Min	   Max	  
%	  of	  countries	  
reducing	  
%	  of	  countries	  
increasing	  
Change	  in	  Import	  
Quantity	   -­‐6985	   -­‐196943	   391765	   75.00%	   25.00%	  
	  
(147638)	  
	   	   	   	  Change	  in	  Wheat	  
Availability	  	   -­‐293934	   -­‐5169292	   2508935	   41.67%	   58.33%	  
	  
(1833997)	  
	   	   	   	  Number	  of	  
Partners	   3	   -­‐1	   10	   8.33%	   83.33%	  
	  
(3)	  
	   	   	   	  Betweenness	  
Centrality	   -­‐24	   -­‐532	   1090	   58.33%	   33.33%	  
	  	   (409.39)	  
	   	   	   	  *Average	  change	  for	  all	  MENA	  trading	  partners	  with	  Kazakhstan	  between	  2008	  and	  2007	  
2009:	  Argentina	  In	  Argentina	  wheat	  is	  planted	  from	  April	  to	  September	  and	  harvested	  October	  to	  January.	  	  In	  2005,	  Argentina	  represented	  7%	  of	  the	  total	  exports	  to	  the	  MENA	  region.	  	  Argentina	  raised	  recurring	  export	  restrictions	  between	  2007	  and	  2009.	  Argentina	  banned	  wheat	  exports	  effectively	  by	  closing	  its	  export	  registry	  from	  March	  to	  November	  2007.	  	  	  After	  re-­‐opening	  the	  registry	  briefly	  in	  November,	  it	  was	  again	  closed	  in	  December	  2007,	  re-­‐opened	  in	  January,	  but	  then	  closed	  again	  from	  February	  to	  May	  2008.	  In	  between	  these	  changes,	  Argentina	  raised	  export	  taxes	  on	  several	  grain	  products	  and	  shortened	  the	  period	  in	  which	  the	  registration	  must	  be	  used,	  from	  365	  to	  45	  days.	  	  All	  of	  these	  restrictive	  actions	  prompted	  farmer	  strikes,	  which	  further	  reduced	  local	  wheat	  supply.	  80	  	  	  In	  2007,	  Argentina	  had	  major	  exports	  (over	  100,000	  MT	  of	  wheat)	  to	  Algeria,	  Yemen,	  UAE,	  and	  Egypt.	  	  In	  2008	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Dollive,	  Kendall.	  “The	  Impact	  of	  Export	  Restraints	  on	  Rising	  Grain	  Prices	  The	  Impact	  of	  Export	  Restraints	  on	  Rising	  Grain	  Prices.”	  US	  International	  Trade	  Commission	  Office	  of	  Economics	  Working	  Paper	  2008-­‐09-­‐A	  (2008):	  25.	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it	  maintained	  a	  large	  trade	  relationship	  with	  Algeria,	  UAE,	  and	  increased	  trade	  five	  times	  with	  Morocco.	  However,	  trade	  with	  Egypt	  decreased	  significantly.	  	   Because	  exporters	  were	  previously	  allowed	  to	  use	  their	  export	  license	  within	  1	  year	  of	  receiving	  it,	  effects	  of	  the	  ban	  in	  late	  2007	  were	  not	  evident	  in	  the	  market	  until	  late	  2008.	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  ban	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  was	  not	  observed	  until	  2009.	  	  In	  this	  year,	  Argentina	  reduced	  trade	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  MENA	  partners,	  but	  more	  than	  tripled	  its	  exports	  to	  Iran,	  which	  had	  faced	  a	  severe	  drought81	  as	  well	  as	  an	  invasive	  fungus82	  both	  of	  which	  severely	  reduced	  Iran’s	  domestic	  harvests.	  	  However,	  Algeria	  and	  Egypt	  experienced	  a	  boom	  in	  domestic	  production,	  and	  thus	  reduced	  imports	  overall.	  	  Algeria	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  halt	  imports	  altogether	  starting	  in	  April	  2009.83	  	   Argentina’s	  ban	  was	  observed	  for	  most	  of	  2009	  as	  well,	  and	  wasn’t	  lifted	  until	  October	  1,	  2009,	  at	  which	  time	  the	  export	  agency	  Oncca	  allowed	  registration	  for	  exporters	  who	  committed	  to	  simultaneously	  supply	  the	  domestic	  market	  to	  meet	  government	  targets.84	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Shean,	  Michael.	  “Iran:	  Another	  Disappointing	  Wheat	  Harvest	  Ahead	  in	  2009/10.”	  USDA	  Commodity	  
Intelligence	  Report	  (2009):	  n.	  pag.	  82	  “GLOBAL:	  Killer	  Wheat	  Fungus	  a	  Threat	  to	  Global	  Food	  Security?”	  IRIN	  News	  2008.	  83	  Seifarth,	  Kurt,	  and	  Nabila	  Hales.	  “Algeria	  Grain	  and	  Feed	  Annual.”	  USDA	  Global	  Agricultural	  Information	  
Network	  AG1105	  (2011):	  n.	  pag.	  84	  Orihuela,	  Rodrigo,	  and	  Ruitenberg,	  Rudy.	  “Argentina	  Ends	  Corn,	  Wheat	  Export	  Ban	  as	  Crops	  Shrink.”	  Bloomberg	  (2009):	  n.	  pag.	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Deviation)	   Min	   Max	  





Change	  in	  Imports	  
from	  Argentina	   -­‐52467	   -­‐346363	   218560	   60.00%	   20.00%	  
	  
(152753)	  
	   	   	   	  Change	  in	  Wheat	  
Availability	  	   1473645	   -­‐61860	   8341250	   20.00%	   80.00%	  
	  
(2524827)	  
	   	   	   	  Number	  of	  Partners	   -­‐2	   -­‐4	   1	   80.00%	   10.00%	  
	  
(1.52)	  
	   	   	   	  Betweenness	  
Centrality	   -­‐83	   -­‐679	   198	   40.00%	   50.00%	  
	  
(254)	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  *Average	  change	  for	  all	  MENA	  trading	  partners	  with	  Argentina	  between	  2009	  and	  2008	  
	  	  
2010:	  Russia	  After	  an	  extreme	  heat	  wave	  in	  2010,	  with	  the	  highest	  recorded	  temperatures	  seen	  in	  130	  years,	  Russia’s	  grain	  crop	  suffered	  significantly.	  	  In	  response,	  Russian	  government	  instituted	  Resolution	  599,	  a	  grain	  export	  ban	  from	  August	  15	  2010	  to	  December	  31,	  2010.	  	  The	  ban	  was	  later	  extended	  to	  July	  2011.	  85	  	  Resolution	  599	  was	  declared	  on	  August	  5,	  and	  began	  to	  be	  enforced	  on	  August	  6th,	  with	  local	  authorities	  forbidding	  the	  loading	  of	  already	  purchased	  grain	  onto	  railcars.	  	  The	  ban	  allowed	  existing	  grain	  contracts	  to	  be	  canceled	  without	  payment	  of	  penalties.	  	  It	  was	  suspected	  that	  traders	  requested	  this	  ban,	  as	  the	  gap	  between	  current	  purchase	  price	  and	  contract	  price	  increased,	  along	  with	  local	  prices.86	  	  Since	  Russia	  is	  an	  important	  exporter,	  global	  prices	  rose	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  ban.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Welton,	  George.	  “The	  Impact	  of	  Russia’s	  2010	  Grain	  Export	  Ban.”	  Oxfam	  Policy	  and	  Practice.	  (2011):	  n.	  pag.	  Web.	  2	  Mar.	  2014.	  86	  Vassilieva,	  Yelena,	  and	  Mary	  Ellen	  Smith.	  “Ban	  on	  Grain	  Exports	  from	  Russia	  Comes	  to	  Force	  on	  August.”	  
USDA	  Global	  Agricultural	  Information	  Network	  RS1039	  (2010):	  n.	  pag.	  Print.	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The	  impact	  was	  largest	  for	  Egypt,	  which	  previously	  relied	  on	  Russia	  for	  50%	  of	  its	  wheat	  imports.	  	  Estimates	  of	  the	  incurred	  costs	  for	  Egypt,	  which	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  existing	  stocks	  and	  make	  short-­‐term	  purchases	  at	  higher	  prices,	  range	  from	  USD36	  million	  (a	  31%	  increase)	  to	  USD68	  million	  (a	  68%	  increase).	  	  Including	  the	  costs	  of	  subsidies	  on	  both	  grain	  and	  bread,	  total	  costs	  to	  the	  government	  were	  predicted	  to	  reach	  USD400-­‐700	  million.87	  	  
C.	  Summary	  of	  MENA	  Countries’	  Key	  Indicators	  The	  table	  below	  depicts	  summary	  information	  for	  all	  countries	  in	  the	  MENA	  region	  that	  consistently	  reported	  total	  imports	  and	  value	  of	  imports.	  Countries	  are	  ordered	  from	  approximately	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  least,	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  number	  of	  losses	  they	  incurred	  on	  all	  of	  these	  indicators.	  	  An	  increase	  in	  average	  price	  paid	  or	  import	  dependency	  ratio	  is	  considered	  a	  loss,	  since	  increases	  in	  these	  categories	  imply	  a	  negative	  outcome	  for	  that	  country.	  Djibouti,	  Kuwait,	  Syria,	  Iraq	  and	  Iran	  did	  not	  have	  complete	  data	  in	  this	  category	  and	  thus	  were	  not	  included	  in	  this	  analysis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  ibid.	  	  




Total-Wheat-Imports-(kg) 191721000 154728055 >19% 44568910 >71% 310699884 597% 1661235437 435% 1101030603 >34%
Value-of-Wheat-Imports-(USD) 30610719 25215762 >18% 7952845 >68% 96269180 1110% 334379349 247% 242961290 >27%
Average-Wheat-Import-Price** 0.16 0.16 2% 0.18 9% 0.31 74% 0.20 >35% 0.22 10%
IDR-(Import-Dependency-Ratio)** 0.02 0.02 0% 0.01 >50% 0.05 400% 0.19 280% 0.15 >21%
Number-of-Partners 7 6 >14% 5 >17% 8 60% 14 75% 11 >21%
Betweenness-Centrality 463.55 310.114 >33% 390.026 26% 241.192 >38% 376.32 56% 214.703 >43%
Malta
Total-Wheat-Imports-(kg) 29861387 20368506 >32% 65852493 223% 63542851 >4% 45283479 >29% 32960822 >27%
Value-of-Wheat-Imports-(USD) 5695475 4226782 >26% 19946509 372% 25460383 28% 11019128 >57% 7830050 >29%
Average-Wheat-Import-Price** 0.19 0.21 9% 0.30 46% 0.40 32% 0.24 >39% 0.24 >2%
IDR-(Import-Dependency-Ratio)** 0.67 0.53 >21% 0.77 45% 0.99 29% 0.64 >35% 0.37 >42%
Number-of-Partners 7 7 0% 9 29% 7 >22% 4 >43% 8 100%
Betweenness-Centrality 8.122 0 >100% 621.667 0% 10.986 >98% 53.333 385% 49.064 >8%
Algeria
Total-Wheat-Imports-(kg) 5685248260 7804165197 37% 4855880916 >38% 6486531056 34% 5719727585 >12% 5232372429 >9%
Value-of-Wheat-Imports-(USD) 1024483543 997023966 >3% 1394314539 40% 3174186861 128% 1830345530 >42% 1251588298 >32%
Average-Wheat-Import-Price** 0.18 0.13 >29% 0.29 125% 0.49 70% 0.32 >35% 0.24 >25%
IDR-(Import-Dependency-Ratio)** 0.54 0.51 >6% 0.5 >2% 0.66 32% 0.52 >21% 0.45 >13%
Number-of-Partners 22 22 0% 21 >5% 21 0% 18 >14% 16 >11%
Betweenness-Centrality 409.717 152.002 >63% 50 >67% 87.028 74% 284.658 227% 10.417 >96%
Morocco
Total-Wheat-Imports-(kg) 2636872376 1825800255 >31% 3683481822 102% 4083575296 11% 2390344284 >41% 3236619650 35%
Value-of-Wheat-Imports-(USD) 468797713 351567375 >25% 1129025053 221% 1613508056 43% 683063196 >58% 878460906 29%
Average-Wheat-Import-Price** 0.18 0.19 8% 0.31 59% 0.40 29% 0.29 >28% 0.27 >5%
IDR-(Import-Dependency-Ratio)** 0.35 0.17 >51% 0.58 241% 0.46 >21% 0.23 >50% 0.3 30%
Number-of-Partners 14 16 14% 20 25% 22 10% 19 >14% 18 >5%
Betweenness-Centrality 114.665 47 >59% 605.958 1189% 277.781 >54% 115.608 >58% 68.978 >40%
Yemen
Total-Wheat-Imports-(kg) 2883670000 2429423788 >16% 2362601742 >3% 2126632142 >10% 2798891482 32% 2654890637 >5%
Value-of-Wheat-Imports-(USD) 357270726 390964896 9% 671948675 72% 955743282 42% 735580299 >23% 708593820 >4%
Average-Wheat-Import-Price** 0.12 0.16 30% 0.28 77% 0.45 58% 0.26 >42% 0.27 2%
IDR-(Import-Dependency-Ratio)** 0.97 0.9 >7% 0.9 0% 0.78 >13% 0.81 4% 0.77 >5%
Number-of-Partners 10 15 50% 11 >27% 14 27% 12 >14% 12 0%
Betweenness-Centrality 96.26 120.205 25% 227.526 89% 41.677 >82% 128.156 207% 62.681 >51%
United-Arab-Emirates
Total-Wheat-Imports-(kg) 1678384159 0 631346123 775472716 23% 0 0
Value-of-Wheat-Imports-(USD) 217865390 150498853 >31% 169066528 12% 297617419 76% 232158626 >22% 214456239 >8%
Average-Wheat-Import-Price** 0.13 0.18 36% 0.27 51% 0.38 43% 0.27 >29% 0.25 >7%
IDR-(Import-Dependency-Ratio)** 1 1.02 2% 1 >2% 1.03 3% 1.23 19% 2.32 89%
Number-of-Partners 21 22 5% 20 >9% 19 >5% 16 >16% 22 38%
Betweenness-Centrality 916.734 732.75 >20% 1342.427 83% 810.768 >40% 838.57 3% 1241.673 48%
Egypt
Total-Wheat-Imports-(kg) 5687760187 5816910057 2% 5911035945 2% 4077543052 >31% 4059927117 0% 9926578119 145%
Value-of-Wheat-Imports-(USD) 924572493 964539092 4% 1563939816 62% 2110912135 35% 1576054905 >25% 2181907400 38%
Average-Wheat-Import-Price** 0.16 0.17 2% 0.26 60% 0.52 96% 0.39 >25% 0.22 >43%
IDR-(Import-Dependency-Ratio)** 0.32 0.39 22% 0.41 5% 0.39 >5% 0.39 0% 0.46 18%
Number-of-Partners 13 20 54% 11 >45% 21 91% 19 >10% 19 0%
Betweenness-Centrality 928.506 379.967 >59% 391.576 3% 1481.56 278% 802.968 >46% 116.133 >86%
Tunisia
Total-Wheat-Imports-(kg) 1132924204 1338643043 18% 1696282951 27% 1762439922 4% 1232426102 >30% 1914864072 55%
Value-of-Wheat-Imports-(USD) 176990595 233770037 32% 575666388 146% 810606886 41% 322174639 >60% 476161558 48%
Average-Wheat-Import-Price** 0.16 0.17 12% 0.34 94% 0.46 36% 0.26 >43% 0.25 >5%
IDR-(Import-Dependency-Ratio)** 0.31 0.39 26% 0.42 8% 0.52 24% 0.32 >38% 0.55 72%
Number-of-Partners 12 18 50% 17 >6% 20 18% 11 >45% 17 55%
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Bahrain
Total.Wheat.Imports.(kg) 83333149 14443358 >83% 3060309 >79% 126414102 4031% 63497159 >50% 88053001 39%
Value.of.Wheat.Imports.(USD) 15956755 3305026 >79% 1495593 >55% 52379907 3402% 17364311 >67% 35934407 107%
Average.Wheat.Import.Price** 0.19 0.23 20% 0.49 114% 0.41 >15% 0.27 >34% 0.41 49%
IDR.(Import.Dependency.Ratio)** 1 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 0%
Number.of.Partners 9 8 >11% 3 >63% 7 133% 4 >43% 4 0%
Betweenness.Centrality 5.667
Jordan
Total.Wheat.Imports.(kg) #N/A 402516584 #N/A 793390670 97% 975748578 23% 229175229 >77% 489645249 114%
Value.of.Wheat.Imports.(USD) #N/A 62729964 #N/A 223491825 256% 381828730 71% 109316578 >71% 110610223 1%
Average.Wheat.Import.Price** #N/A 0.16 #N/A 0.28 81% 0.39 39% 0.48 22% 0.23 >53%
IDR.(Import.Dependency.Ratio)** 0.6 0.54 >10% 0.71 31% 0.67 >6% 0.49 >27% 0.43 >12%
Number.of.Partners 13 10 >23% 6 >40% 10 67% 6 >40% 9 50%
Betweenness.Centrality 212.749 269.374 27% 74.042 >73% 153.779 108% 153.211 0% 232.07 51%
Oman
Total.Wheat.Imports.(kg) 1.21E+08 204702711 69% 242308627 18% 248267752 2% 174739304 >30% 246330779 41%
Value.of.Wheat.Imports.(USD) 25708671 41853861 63% 103859353 148% 155737298 50% 41458593 >73% 65851920 59%
Average.Wheat.Import.Price** 0.21 0.20 >3% 0.43 110% 0.63 46% 0.24 >62% 0.27 13%
IDR.(Import.Dependency.Ratio)** 1.08 1.04 >4% 1.02 >2% 1.06 4% 1.01 >5% 1 >1%
Number.of.Partners 7 11 57% 8 >27% 12 50% 8 >33% 11 38%
Betweenness.Centrality 27.726 304.531 998% 44.068 >86% 36.88 >16% 156.119 323% 17.829 >89%
Qatar
Total.Wheat.Imports.(kg) 59119232 21506829 >64% 100505875 367% 114201672 14% #N/A #N/A 138914155 #N/A
Value.of.Wheat.Imports.(USD) 11940792 5243476 >56% 32755441 525% 61372704 87% #N/A #N/A 39591628 #N/A
Average.Wheat.Import.Price** 0.20 0.24 21% 0.33 34% 0.54 65% #N/A #N/A 0.29 #N/A
IDR.(Import.Dependency.Ratio)** 1 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 0%
Number.of.Partners 11 6 >45% 7 17% 7 0% 3 >57% 4 33%
Betweenness.Centrality 144.095 38.562 >73% 2.9 >92% 73.5 2434% 2.25 >97% 0.857 >62%
Lebanon
Total.Wheat.Imports.(kg) 4.03E+08 321452338 >20% 410442109 28% 418863285 2% 537691541 28% 506182766 >6%
Value.of.Wheat.Imports.(USD) 63042000 59322923 >6% 114721413 93% 160784733 40% 108886493 >32% 129266439 19%
Average.Wheat.Import.Price** 0.16 0.18 18% 0.28 51% 0.38 37% 0.20 >47% 0.26 26%
IDR.(Import.Dependency.Ratio)** 0.74 0.68 >8% 0.80 >1087% 0.79 >107% 0.85 >179% 0.91 >151%
Number.of.Partners 5 12 140% 6 >50% 7 17% 11 57% 14 27%
Betweenness.Centrality 683.19 688.443 1% 1379.933 100% 1102.537 >20% 811.551 >26% 874.095 8%
Saudi.Arabia
Total.Wheat.Imports.(kg) 2277299 2286211 0% 1985895 >13% 151006000 7504% 1300922000 762% 1619540000 24%
Value.of.Wheat.Imports.(USD) 760197 1013182 33% 657793 >35% 50225396 7535% 373168063 643% 400014367 7%
Average.Wheat.Import.Price** 0.33 0.44 33% 0.33 >25% 0.33 0% 0.29 >14% 0.25 >14%
IDR.(Import.Dependency.Ratio)** 0 0 0 0.05 0.26 420% 0.29 12%
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Section	  4:	  Conclusions	  and	  Discussion	  
	   This	  project	  attempted	  to	  understand	  the	  global	  wheat	  network,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  developments	  in	  the	  MENA	  region,	  to	  add	  to	  the	  body	  of	  knowledge	  that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  predicting	  food	  security	  risks	  for	  net-­‐importers.	  	  New	  indicators	  from	  Social	  Network	  Analysis	  were	  used.	  	  	  First,	  the	  global	  wheat	  network	  was	  analyzed	  from	  1990-­‐2012,	  using	  both	  network	  level	  indicators	  such	  as	  number	  of	  links	  and	  density,	  and	  averages	  of	  node-­‐specific	  indicators	  such	  as	  centrality	  and	  clustering	  coefficients.	  	  Overall	  trade	  instances	  and	  density	  are	  increasing,	  while	  clustering	  and	  betweenness	  centrality	  are	  decreasing.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  network	  is	  overall	  becoming	  more	  diversified	  and	  less	  centralized	  or	  clustered.	  	  Further	  research	  is	  recommended	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  clusters	  that	  are	  detected	  using	  Social	  Network	  Analysis	  calculations—do	  these	  clusters	  correspond	  to	  regions	  or	  trade	  agreements?	  Are	  they	  tight	  clusters	  or	  fairly	  fluid?	  Do	  they	  change	  over	  time?	  	  	  Next,	  the	  wheat	  network	  was	  analyzed	  using	  several	  node-­‐specific	  centrality	  measures,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  MENA	  countries.	  	  For	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  which	  scores	  both	  net-­‐importers	  and	  net-­‐exporters	  highly,	  the	  major	  exporters	  consistently	  receive	  the	  highest	  scores.	  	  However,	  impacts	  of	  trade	  bans	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Egypt,	  which	  disappears	  from	  the	  top	  ten	  rankings	  during	  the	  year	  that	  it	  faced	  multiple	  export	  bans	  from	  its	  partners.	  	  	  Analyzing	  the	  network	  by	  Authority	  Centrality	  demonstrates	  net-­‐importing	  countries’	  strength	  of	  partners.	  	  Iran’s	  ability	  to	  maintain	  partners	  despite	  trade	  bans	  is	  observed	  through	  its	  continued	  high	  ranking	  in	  this	  category.	  	  Authority	  centrality	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  best	  indicator	  of	  a	  strong	  network	  for	  net-­‐importers.	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  Finally,	  the	  analysis	  took	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  look	  at	  MENA	  countries’	  reactions	  to	  export	  bans.	  	  Some	  countries	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  wheat	  availability	  despite	  partners’	  trade	  bans	  through	  building	  new	  partnerships,	  increased	  imports	  from	  existing	  partners,	  or	  a	  boom	  in	  production	  simultaneous	  with	  the	  ban.	  	  Major	  players	  such	  as	  Egypt	  and	  Iran	  were	  able	  to	  increase	  trade	  with	  the	  country	  implementing	  the	  ban.	  	  Iran	  in	  particular	  greatly	  increased	  its	  trade	  with	  both	  Kazakhstan	  and	  Argentina	  when	  these	  countries	  implemented	  trade	  bans.	  	  Further	  research	  should	  explore	  how	  these	  countries	  were	  able	  to	  accomplish	  this—some	  hypotheses	  include	  trade	  agreements,	  futures	  or	  contract	  purchasing,	  exertion	  of	  political	  influence,	  or	  willingness	  to	  pay	  a	  higher	  price.	  	  Centrality	  measures	  such	  as	  eigenvector	  centrality	  and	  authority	  centrality	  are	  reflective	  of	  reactions	  to	  bans	  but	  perhaps	  not	  predictive.	  	  Impacts	  of	  trade	  bans	  are	  seen	  in	  the	  eigenvector	  centrality	  measures	  but	  this	  is	  ex-­‐post	  analysis.	  	  For	  example,	  Egypt	  consistently	  had	  a	  high	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  until	  the	  year	  that	  it	  faced	  several	  bans	  and	  was	  not	  able	  to	  increase	  its	  imports.	  	  	  In	  2008	  and	  2009,	  when	  Iran	  increased	  its	  imports	  from	  the	  very	  countries	  that	  were	  implementing	  trade	  bans,	  it	  rises	  from	  a	  ranking	  of	  over	  50th	  in	  authority	  centrality	  in	  2007	  to	  2nd	  in	  2008	  and	  5th	  in	  2009.	  	  Again,	  this	  demonstrates	  a	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  indicator	  to	  changes	  in	  power	  structures	  within	  the	  network,	  but	  only	  after	  the	  country	  has	  reacted	  to	  a	  shock.	  	  The	  first	  step	  in	  predicting	  a	  country’s	  ability	  to	  withstand	  a	  shock	  in	  a	  certain	  market	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  trade	  network	  itself.	  	  This	  network	  analysis	  methods	  was	  
	   52	  
highly	  useful	  in	  describing	  the	  wheat	  trade	  network.	  However,	  further	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  if	  these	  network	  science	  indicators	  provide	  any	  predictive	  power	  in	  regards	  to	  either	  crisis	  or	  resilience.	  	  One	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  if	  a	  country	  has	  a	  high	  clustering	  coefficient	  (meaning	  it	  trades	  mainly	  within	  its	  own	  cluster),	  and	  low	  centrality	  indicators,	  it	  is	  more	  at	  risk	  for	  a	  crisis	  in	  food	  trade.	  	  If	  there	  is	  a	  decline	  in	  availability	  within	  that	  country’s	  region	  or	  cluster,	  there	  will	  not	  be	  an	  alternative	  for	  that	  country,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  external	  or	  more	  powerful	  connections	  necessary.	  	  However,	  several	  countries,	  such	  as	  Egypt	  and	  Iran,	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  wheat	  supplies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  trade	  bans,	  despite	  scoring	  low	  on	  centrality	  indicators	  prior	  to	  the	  ban.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that,	  given	  the	  fluidity	  of	  the	  network,	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  many	  partners	  (since	  many	  countries	  can	  produce	  wheat),	  network	  analysis	  is	  not	  a	  useful	  tool	  in	  predicting	  a	  country’s	  ability	  to	  withstand	  a	  shock	  to	  the	  wheat	  market.	  	  In	  a	  more	  structured	  network	  where	  there	  are	  a	  defined	  number	  of	  producers,	  such	  as	  oil,	  perhaps	  network	  analysis	  would	  be	  more	  predictive.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  there	  is	  an	  indicator	  that	  could	  provide	  the	  necessary	  prediction,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  not	  analyzed	  in	  this	  study.	  For	  this	  reason,	  further	  research	  would	  improve	  understanding	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  social	  network	  analysis	  methods	  to	  predict	  both	  vulnerability	  to	  a	  crisis	  and	  ability	  to	  withstand	  this	  crisis.	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Appendix	  1:	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Global	  Network	  
Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  1990	  
	  	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality.	  	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  1995	  
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality.	  	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	  	  	   	  
	   55	  
Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  2000	  
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  5.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  2005	  	  
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  2006	  
	  
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  2007	  	  
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  2008	  	  
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  2009
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  2010	  
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  2012	  
	  	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  eigenvector	  centrality,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  Out-­‐Degree	  2006	  
	  	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  out	  degree,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	  	  Yellow	  nodes	  indicate	  countries	  that	  implement	  export	  bans.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  Out-­‐Degree	  2007	  
Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  out	  degree,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	  	  Yellow	  nodes	  indicate	  countries	  that	  implement	  export	  bans.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  Out-­‐Degree	  2008
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  out	  degree,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	  	  Yellow	  nodes	  indicate	  countries	  that	  implement	  export	  bans.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  Out-­‐Degree	  2009
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  out	  degree,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	  	  Yellow	  nodes	  indicate	  countries	  that	  implement	  export	  bans.	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Global	  Wheat	  Trade	  Network,	  Out-­‐Degree	  2010	  
	  Source:	  UNCOMTRADE	  database,	  reported	  exports.	  	  Nodes	  are	  sized	  by	  out	  degree,	  and	  filtered	  by	  node	  degree	  higher	  than	  10.	  Visualization	  was	  created	  in	  Gephi.	  	  Yellow	  nodes	  indicate	  countries	  that	  implement	  export	  bans.	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